Factsheets
To help clarify key issues in U.S.-China relations, the Committee for a Sane U.S.-China Policy will periodically publish Factsheets on issues of particular concern. These will be written by members of our Steering Committee or other scholars with expertise in the field.
Factsheet #1: The “One China” Principle, by Zhiqun Zhu
FACTSHEET #1:
The “One China” Policy Explained
Prepared by Zhiqun Zhu
Steering Committee Member, Committee for a Sane U.S.-China Policy
November 21, 2021
The concept of “one China” can be traced back to the Chinese Civil War in the late 1940s. In October 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing after the communist forces defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist forces. Chiang and the Republic of China (ROC) government that was established in 1912 retreated to Taiwan, along with a million or so followers of the Chinese Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (KMT).
From 1949 to 1971, the ROC in Taiwan continued to represent all of China at international organizations including the United Nations (UN), while the PRC was excluded from much of the international system. The United States maintained diplomatic relations with the ROC, supported its UN membership, and provided it with military assistance. Both Chiang and Mao emphasized there was but “one China” and that their respective government was the only legitimate government representing both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan.
The global tide turned in 1971, when the PRC was admitted into the UN as the representative of China, replacing the ROC. The United States had flirted with the idea of two seats for China, but it was shot down by both the PRC and the ROC since it would create “two Chinas.”
The United States gradually changed its policy and eventually switched diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. In the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué issued during President Richard Nixon’s visit to China, the U.S. side declared: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.”
In the 1978 U.S.-PRC joint communiqué, the U.S. government officially recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China and reaffirmed its acknowledgement of the Chinese position that “there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” U.S. diplomatic relations with the PRC date from this time. At the same time, the communiqué stated that “the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.”
In a third U.S.-PRC joint communiqué, from 1982, the U.S. government, understanding the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, stated that “it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution.” The United States also reiterated that “it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan.’”
The PRC considers these three joint communiqués as the foundation of U.S.-China relations. Beijing’s “one China principle” emphasizes that there is only one China, including both the mainland and Taiwan, and the PRC is the sole legitimate government of all of China. Beijing insists that despite the separation of Taiwan and mainland China, China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity remain unchanged. It pursues peaceful reunification with Taiwan under “one China” but has not ruled out the use of force if necessary. President Xi Jinping reiterated during the November 15, 2021 virtual meeting with President Joe Biden that Beijing will be “compelled to take resolute measures,” should the separatist forces for Taiwan independence “provoke us, force our hands or even cross the red line.”
To preserve U.S. relations with Taiwan, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and President Jimmy Carter signed it into law in 1979. The TRA has since guided U.S. “unofficial” relations with Taiwan. It stipulates that the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to “enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” In accordance with the TRA, the United States has also adopted a stance of “strategic ambiguity” with regard to whether it will come to Taiwan’s defense should a war break out across the Taiwan Strait, saying any attempt by China to seize Taiwan by military means would be considered a matter “of grave concern to the United States,” but not one automatically requiring a U.S. military response. This has served as dual deterrence – for Taipei not to provoke a conflict with Beijing by declaring independence and for Beijing not to use force against Taiwan.
In 1982, when the United States and the PRC issued their third joint communiqué on reducing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the Reagan administration offered Six Assurances to Taiwan privately, promising that the United States would not:
(1) set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan;
(2) alter the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act;
(3) consult with China in advance before making decisions about United States arms sales to Taiwan;
(4) mediate between Taiwan and China;
(5) alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan and pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China; and
(6) formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.
Obviously, the three joint communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances are contradictory in many aspects. Beijing has criticized Washington for not strictly following its “one China” commitments.
Taiwan continued to abide by “one China” from 1949 to the 1990s under the rule of the KMT. In 1990, the ROC government in Taiwan set up the National Unification Council to promote integration between mainland China and Taiwan. Officials from the two sides of the Taiwan Strait met in Hong Kong in 1992, out of which emerged the term “1992 Consensus”—where both sides agreed there is only one China, but that the meaning of “one China” could be different. However, in 1999, ROC President Lee Teng-hui proposed that relations across the Taiwan Strait were “special state-to-state relations,” departing from “one China.”
Taiwan completed its transition to democratic rule in the 1990s. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power in 2000 and returned to office in 2016. The DPP and current president Tsai Ing-wen claim that Taiwan is already independent, and China and Taiwan are not subordinate to each other. As Tsai told The BBC in early 2020, “We are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China, Taiwan,” and “We deserve respect from China.” The KMT, now in opposition, continues to follow the one China-based “1992 Consensus.”
For a long time, the United States has based its “one China” policy on the TRA and the three U.S.-PRC joint communiqués. More recently, Washington has publicly added the previously private Six Assurances to the equation when defining its “one China” policy.
U.S. officials tend to make a distinction between Washington’s “one China policy” and Beijing’s “one China principle.” They emphasize that the TRA takes precedence over the three joint communiqués but are vague about the exact status of Taiwan under Washington’s “one China policy.”
The U.S. government insists it has not changed its commitment to “one China,” but has significantly upgraded relations with Taipei since the Trump administration. This began under President Trump, when senior U.S. diplomats were sent to meet with their Taiwanese counterparts for the first time in over 30 years, and has continued with the Biden administration’s efforts to support Taiwan’s participation in the UN system, which it asserts is consistent with the “one China policy.” The Biden administration has further signaled its support for the Taiwanese government through conspicuous military displays in the area, including regular transits by U.S. warships through the Taiwan Strait.
For Additional Information:
Congressional Research Service (CRS), “China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei,” October 10, 2014, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL30341.pdf
Congressional Research Service (CRS), “President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan,” October 8, 2020, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11665.pdf
Michael J. Green and Bonnie S. Glaser, “What Is the U.S. ‘One China’ Policy, and Why Does It Matter?” Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), January 13, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter
The Taiwan Relations Act: https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/taiwan-relations-act/
The three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués: https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus/eng/zmgx/doc/ctc/
The PRC perspective: “White Paper: The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” The Taiwan Affairs Office and The Information Office of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China, February 21, 2000, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceno/eng/ztxw/twwt/t110655.htm