CHINA, THE U.S., & THE WARS IN UKRAINE & GAZA
Although still under way, the war in Ukraine is having profound repercussions around the world – not least upon China and U.S.-China relations. This is so because China has developed a close strategic partnership with Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the two countries enjoy a significant trade relationship. This tight partnership was given renewed emphasis on February 4, 2022, when President Xi Jinping of China met with Putin at the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics in Beijing and signed a 5,000-word document pledging ever-closer relations. However, the durability of the Sino-Russian relationship has been called into question ever since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24.
China has also long enjoyed good relations with Ukraine, and its foreign policy has always emphasized the sanctity of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Hence, Chinese leaders were caught off guard by the Russian invasion – no doubt troubled by Russia’s brutal violation of a sovereign state’s territorial integrity but unwilling to denounce its close ally. Since then, Beijing has sought to pursue a balancing act on Ukraine, expressing dismay at the loss of life and offering to provide humanitarian aid, but unwilling to join the international community in denouncing Russia for its aggression.
The United States has imposed severe economic sanctions on Russia and is insisting that China do nothing to assist Moscow in evading those sanctions, for example by providing Russia with vital supplies of arms and ammunition. The Biden administration has also warned Beijing of negative “consequences” if it fails to comply with these requests. The Chinese have denied they are providing Russia any such assistance but claim the conflict is not of their doing and should be settled by the parties involved, including the United States. Many peace advocates have also called on Beijing to play a proactive role in persuading Putin to stop the fighting, using its superior economic clout to influence his thinking.
The war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, triggered by Hamas’ deadly incursion into Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 and Israel’s subsequent drive to obliterate Hamas through air and ground attacks on its Gaza strongholds, is also becoming a factor in U.S.-China relations.
In response to these developments, the Committee will post articles and documents of interest on the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza on U.S.-China relations, with the most recent items visible first.
Posts in this section as of June 18, 2022:
Dec. 6, 2023: Israel-Hamas War: China’s top diplomat Wang Yi calls for ‘major countries’ to be fair and impartial
March 3, 2023: China Releases Paper on “Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”
June 18, 2022: Xi-Putin Conversation on June 15 Prompts Multiple Interpretations
May 3, 2022: U.S. officials relieved as China appears to heed warnings on Russia
April 13, 2020: U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellon Warns China Against Siding with Russia
April 6, 2022: China’s “Balancing Act” on Ukraine Looking Less & Less Viable -Analysis by Michael Klare
March 22, 2022: China’s Desired Endgame in Ukraine -Analysis by Yun Sun of the Stimson Center
March 22, 2022: Biden Warns Xi of “Consequences” if Beijing Aids Russia in Ukraine: Analysis by Michael Klare
March 12, 2022: Hu Wei, a Prominent Chinese Analyst, Calls on Beijing to Sever Ties with Putin
March 12, 2022: Why is China reluctant to lead mediation between Russia and Ukraine? by Zhiqun Zhu
Israel-Gaza war: China’s top diplomat Wang Yi calls for ‘major countries’ to be fair and impartial
Dewey Sim, South China Morning Post, Dec. 6, 2023
In this article, Sim reports on a Dec. 6 phone call between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in which they discussed the unfolding crisis in Gaza.
[In the call], Wang renewed calls for a two-state solution, saying any arrangement concerning the future of Palestine “must reflect the will of the Palestinian people.” “The top priority is to cease fire and to stop the war as soon as possible,” Wang said, according to a Chinese foreign ministry readout.
“At the crossroads of war and peace, major countries must adhere to fairness and justice, uphold objectivity and impartiality, demonstrate calmness and rationality, and make every effort to cool down the situation and prevent larger-scale humanitarian disasters.”
Wang said China believed that the “core” of the solution was to “respect Palestine’s right to statehood and self-determination.” He said Beijing was willing to work with all parties to make efforts to that end.
China Releases Paper on “Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”
Assessment by Michael Klare, March 3, 2023
On February 24, the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a paper on “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis.” The paper has twelve points, beginning with “respecting the sovereignty of all countries” and “ceasing hostilities,” and includes such points as “stopping unilateral sanctions” and “keeping industrial and supply chains stable.” For complete text, click here
The paper had been much anticipated by Western officials, especially in Europe, who hoped it would include a pledge by China to play a more active diplomatic role in efforts to end the conflict, along with evidence of a greater Chinese inclination to disassociate itself from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. However, most Western analysts found the MFA paper lacking in both those areas, rather displaying a hands-off posture towards cease-fire negotiations and a tendency to echo Moscow’s view of the conflict. For example, the paper refers to the Ukraine “crisis,” not a “war” – an atrocious mischaracterization of the conflict and an obvious capitulation to Putin’s claim that this is a “special military operation,” not a war.
Ideally, the paper would have done the following, but does not:
· Condemn Russia for an unprovoked act of aggression against a sovereign nation.
· In calling for the resolution of the humanitarian crisis, indicate that Russia has been systematically attacking civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and causing widespread civilian casualties, and should immediately halt such attacks.
· In calling for a resumption of peace talks, agree to play an active role in persuading Russia to stop fighting and come to the negotiating table.
· In calling for “post-conflict reconstruction,” makes specific monetary pledges of Chinese support for such efforts.
This is what the paper does do:
· In calling for respect of “the sovereignty of all nations,” makes no distinction between Ukraine’s legally sanctioned sovereignty over its entire territory and Moscow’s illegal claims to sovereignty over parts of Ukraine acquired by means of force.
· In calling for the “abandonment” of “Cold War mentality,” appears to corroborate Moscow’s claim that its “special military operation” in Ukraine was ignited by a “Cold War mentality” on the part of Western powers.
· Condemns sanctions imposed by the West to apply pressure on Moscow
· In its one really positive contribution, rules out the use of nuclear weapons by any party to the conflict and “opposes” the threat of nuclear weapons use – an obvious rebuke to Putin for making such threats.
The release by China of a paper on the Ukraine conflict could have been an opportunity for Chinese leaders to demonstrate a genuine desire to end the fighting there and distance itself from the barbaric tactics being employed by Russian President Vladimir Putin to subdue the Ukrainian population. But it didn’t turn out that way. Instead, the paper seems designed to enable Beijing to claim it has peaceful intentions while simultaneously paying obeisance to Putin’s arguments for perpetuating the violence.
Xi-Putin Conversation on June 15 Prompts Multiple Interpretations
Analysis by Michael Klare, June 18, 2022
On June 15, President Xi Jinping of China spoke by telephone with President Vladimir Putin of Russia. During their conversation, each leader reportedly expressed strong support for the policies of the other, including in the national security realm. But while there appears to have been a high degree of amity in the conversation, with each president praising the work of the other, questions have arisen as to how much support Xi expressed for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
According to the Chinese “readout” of the discussion (see below), the two expressed mutual support for “their respective core interests concerning sovereignty and security,” a wording that could be interpreted as indicating Chinese endorsement of Putin’s claims that the invasion was necessary to ensure Russia’s security. Indeed, the Russian account of the call said Xi “noted the legitimacy of the actions taken by Russia to protect the fundamental national interests in the face of challenges to its security created by external forces.” However, this language does not appear in the Chinese account, suggesting some reluctance on China’s part to be seen as endorsing Putin’s actions.
While it would seem to make political sense for Washington to probe the extent of that reluctance and seek to encourage Beijing’s distancing from the Russian invasion, the State Department released a harsh statement following the Xi-Putin conversation. “More than three months into Russia’ brutal invasion, China is still standing by Russia. It is still echoing Russian propaganda around the world,” a State Department spokesperson said following the call. “Nations that side with Vladimir Putin will inevitably find themselves on the wrong side of history.”
Xi talks with Putin over phone
Xinhua, June 15, 2022
Note: On June 15, President Xi Jinping spoke by telephone with President Vladimir Putin of Russia. In this description of their conversation, from Chinese state news agency Xinhua, it appears that Xi provided Putin with general support for Moscow’s security policies without specifically endorsing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In fact, one can interpret the Xinhua report as indicating that Xi was reluctant to be seen as doing so, instead emphasizing efforts to resolve the conflict in Ukraine peacefully via international negotiations.
During their conversation, Xi noted that since the beginning of this year, bilateral relations have maintained a sound development momentum in the face of global turbulence and transformations….
The Chinese side stands ready to work with the Russian side to push for steady and long-term development of practical bilateral cooperation, Xi said.
China is willing to work with Russia to continue supporting each other on their respective core interests concerning sovereignty and security, as well as on their major concerns, deepening their strategic coordination, and strengthening communication and coordination in such important international and regional organizations as the United Nations, the BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa] mechanism and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Xi said….
The two heads of state also exchanged views on the Ukraine issue. Xi emphasized that China has always independently assessed the situation on the basis of the historical context and the merits of the issue, and actively promoted world peace and the stability of the global economic order.
All parties should push for a proper settlement of the Ukraine crisis in a responsible manner, Xi said, adding that China for this purpose will continue to play its due role.
U.S. relieved as China appears to heed warnings on Russia
Steve Holland, Trevor Hunnicutt and David Brunnstrom, Reuters, May 3, 2022
[In this article, the authors indicate that senior U.S. officials say they have not detected overt Chinese military and economic support for Russia in its war against Ukraine. While U.S. officials told Reuters they remain wary about China's long-standing support for Russia in general, the military and economic support for Russia’s invasion that they worried about has not as yet occurred.]
"We have not seen the PRC provide direct military support to Russia’s war on Ukraine or engage in systematic efforts to help Russia evade our sanctions," a Biden administration official told Reuters, referring to the People's Republic of China.
"We continue to monitor for the PRC and any other country that might provide support to Russia or otherwise evade U.S. and partner sanctions."
As well as steering clear of directly backing Russia's war effort, China has avoided entering new contracts between its state oil refiners and Russia, despite steep discounts. In March its state-run Sinopec Group suspended talks about a major petrochemical investment and a gas marketing venture in Russia.
Treasury Secretary Yellon Warns China Against Siding with Russia
Allen Rappeport, The New York Times, April 13, 2022
[In this article, Rappeport reports on an address given by U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellon before the Atlantic Council in which she warned China of economic consequences if it was found to be aiding Russia in its war against Ukraine or helping Moscow evade sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies.]
“Going forward, it will be increasingly difficult to separate economic issues from broader considerations of national interest, including national security,” Yellen declared. “The world’s attitude towards China and its willingness to embrace further economic integration may well be affected by China’s reaction to our call for resolute action on Russia.”
Secretary Yellen added that Russia’s actions were at odds with China’s longstanding public commitments to sovereignty and territorial integrity and called on China to use its influence with Russia to end the war.
In her speech, Yellon complained of countries, including China, that have continued to engage with Russia despite mounting evidence of the atrocities it has committed in Ukraine.
“Let me now say a few words to those countries who are currently sitting on the fence, perhaps seeing an opportunity to gain by preserving their relationship with Russia and backfilling the void left by others,” she said…. “And let’s be clear: The unified coalition of sanctioning countries will not be indifferent to actions that undermine the sanctions we’ve put in place,” she added.
China’s “Balancing Act” on Ukraine Looking Less & Less Viable
Analysis by Michael Klare
Committee for a Sane U.S.-China Policy
April 5, 2022
Western analysts of China’s stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have tended to call it a “balancing act,” neither condemning Moscow outright nor embracing Russia’s justifications for the invasion. This was evident, for example, in China’s decision to abstain on UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 of March 2, which condemned the Russian invasion and called on Moscow to withdraw its forces. But the time in which Beijing can cling to this ambiguous posture may be running out, as European leaders (among others) insist that China cut its ties with Putin.
Analysts of Chinese policymaking have suggested that Beijing’s struggle to pursue such a fine line reflects its fear of losing Russia as an ally in any future confrontation with the U.S. on one hand along with a fear of being subjected to the same sort of sanctions as Russia has on the other. But some Chinese analysts argue that Beijing must sever its ties with Putin lest it be isolated in the international community and experience severe economic consequences as a result.
The ambivalence reflected in Chinese policy on Russia/Ukraine – and the risks this entails – were on vivid display during two recent events, a visit to Beijing by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on March 30 and a virtual summit between top Chinese and European Union (EU) leaders on April 1.
Following the first of these two events, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told Lavrov, “China-Russia relations have withstood the new test of evolving international landscape, remained on the right course and shown resilient development momentum.” With respect to Ukraine, Wang said that the issue “has a complicated historical context.” Rather than hold Russia responsible for the war, he said it was “both an outburst of long built-up tensions over Europe's security problems, and an outcome of Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation.” China, he said, “support[s] the efforts made by Russia and other parties to prevent a large-scale humanitarian crisis,” without acknowledging that Russia is largely responsible for that crisis. These comments show no evidence of Chinese intent to downgrade their relations with Russia or to condemn Moscow for the brutality on display there.
The next event was the China-EU Summit on April 1. First, European Council President Charles Michel and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen held a virtual meeting with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang; two hours later, they talked with China’s President Xi Jinping.
Both Li and Xi sought to emphasize the centrality of economic cooperation in China-EU relations and claimed that both sides were in essential agreement over Ukraine, wishing to see a speedy peace agreement. Most observers agree, however, that Michel and von der Leyden told the Chinese officials that Europe was becoming increasingly enraged at Russian behavior in Ukraine and that any sign of Chinese support for Moscow would produce a strong negative reaction in Europe.
“The EU’s top priority is to stop the war and protect the Ukrainian people,” Michel reportedly told the Chinese. “We call on China to help end this war,” he added. “China cannot turn a blind eye to Russia’s violation of international law.” Von der Leyen struck a similar note, saying that the EU and Chinese leaders had an “open and frank exchange” on the Ukraine crisis. “There must be respect for international law and Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. China, as a Permanent member of the UN Security Council, has a special responsibility,” she tweeted after the meetings.
With evidence of Russian military atrocities in Ukraine mounting each day, Europeans leaders appear to be increasingly intolerant of China’s balancing act and are demanding that it sever its ties with Moscow. Thus, no matter how much Chinese leaders may wish to retain Russia as an ally, they may be forced to abandon their ties with Putin or risk losing their far important trade ties with Europe.
Ukraine: China’s Desired Endgame
By Yun Sun, Stimson Center, March 22, 2022
[Note: this article was posted on the website of the Stimson Center, a nongovernmental research and policy organization based in Washington, D.C., by Yun Sun, Senior Fellow and Co-Director for China and East Asia at the Center. In it, Sun Yun argues that even as the war in Ukraine rages on, China is unlikely to abandon its alliance with Russia. Below are excerpts from her analysis.]
Caught off-guard [by Putin’s action], China struggled to respond to the invasion, with a sense of uncertainty, dilemma, and defensiveness…. This initial stage of confusion is over. What has emerged is a clear dual strategy of “not opposing Russia” and “not abandoning Ukraine.” While many in China are cognizant of the costs the country will carry for its alignment with Russia, mainstream scholars and senior leaders are increasingly convinced that the war in Ukraine presents a “window of strategic opportunity,” especially in terms of U.S.-China relations. In other words, China will not abandon Russia….
Despite the voices inside and outside of China calling for an overhaul of China’s current Russia policy and to recalibrate its relations with Russia, a major shift of position is unlikely for two reasons. First, abandoning Russia does not solve or alleviate China’s most important external national security challenge, which remains the United States. In fact, strong voices in China advocate against abandoning Russia because the U.S. offers no “rewards” for doing so and they fear China “will be the next on the list after Russia.” At a minimum, Russia’s existence alone is both a counterbalance and a strategic distraction that draws U.S. focus to Europe. Abandoning Russia, and mitigating its threat to the West, could very well leave China to face the full attention and force of a hostile U.S. later – alone.
Another reason for China’s persistence on the current policy course is domestic. Even if China were to adjust its policy towards Russia, as many believe that China will, it will not happen during the Ukraine War. The reason is simple: it is simply too close to the February 4 Joint Statement issued by Xi and Putin [calling for strategic partnership “with no limits”]. Such a prompt change of policy direction would inevitably raise questions about the wisdom of Xi’s decision to take the position in the first place. The 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, scheduled for this fall, is where Xi is expected break the established succession tradition in the Party and ink his third term. Given the discontent within the Party and the country, a reorientation of China’s policy toward Russia equates to a tacit admission of a policy mistake; that is simply untenable in Chinese politics today.
Unlike China’s initial struggle to respond to the repercussions of the Russian invasion, the Chinese policy community is currently prone to the view that the war presents an opportunity for China. China is not a party to the conflict, this is not Chinese territory, and China’s ties with Russia are seen as the leverage to chart a middle way approach between Russia and the West….
China’s approach to the Ukraine war reflects its calculus between costs and benefits. During the initial stage, China wanted the war to end as quickly as possible. It has been concerned about the reputational damage from China’s glaring acquiescence to Russia, as well as its relationship with key players such as Europe, which has been driven closer to the U.S. by the war. China also does not want to see a prolonged war in Ukraine that significantly weakens Russia. As China sees it, the current path of events will leave Russia an international pariah by the end of the war, similar to North Korea but with a bigger nuclear arsenal – not the most reassuring or stabilizing situation. A weak Russia is a less helpful a partner in China’s strategic competition with the United States.
However, China’s desired endgame in the Ukraine war has become more relational than situational: It is about China’s relationship to the war rather than the outcome of the war itself. Because many in China see the war as an opportunity to leverage against the U.S., the key to success lies in the maintenance of a neutrality – even if self-perceived – that leaves room for imagination and other’s efforts to gain China’s cooperation. In this light, the Biden-Xi phone call [of March 18] is seen as China’s success as the U.S. turned to China for consensus. In this sense, not picking a side, or selectively picking certain positions with each side, is itself a position. China sides with Russia on its security concerns, sides with Ukraine on its sovereignty and territorial integrity, sides with Europe on its role to lead the negotiation. But ultimately, China sides with China.
Biden Tells Xi: “Consequences” if Beijing Aids Russian War in Ukraine
Analysis by Michael Klare, March 22, 2022
On Friday, March 18, Presidents Joe Biden of the United States and Xi Jinping of China had a two-hour videocall in which they discussed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and U.S. efforts to compel Moscow to cease fighting through the imposition of severe sanctions. Similar sanctions have been imposed by the EU countries and other Western nations, but Washington also seeks the cooperation of non-Western countries, including China, in blocking Russian efforts to circumvent the sanctions.
China is an important player in this regard as it has viewed Russia as a major strategic ally and has developed close economic ties with that country. In recent years, China has become a major consumer of Russian oil, natural gas, foodstuffs, and military technology, while Russia has come to rely on Chinese investment funds and imports of its manufactured goods. Now, in response to the Russian invasion, the Biden administration wants Beijing to sever Russia’s access to Chinese banks, financial institutions, and weapons producers. Chinese leaders, while seemingly uncomfortable with the brazenness and savagery of the Russian invasion, appear reluctant to abandon their ties with their closest and most powerful ally.
Faced with Chinese recalcitrance in the matter, Washington has taken to threatening Beijing with “consequences” if it fails to comply with its demands. In a meeting in Rome on March 14, for example, national security adviser Jake Sullivan reportedly told his Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi, that the Biden administration has “deep concerns about China’s alignment with Russia at this time” and warned of the “potential implications and consequences” for China if it provided material aid to the Russians. In response to such pressures, Chinese officials have denied that they are providing any such aid to Russia, but have refused to condemn Russia’s invasion or announce concrete measures aimed at closing off Russia’s access to the Chinese economy. This is the backdrop to Biden’s telecall with Xi.
No public transcript or recording of the Biden-Xi meeting has been made public, but both sides have issued their own summaries of the conversation (see below), and various unidentified officials have commented on what has been said. As best as can be determined, Biden reiterated Washington’s concern that China might provide material support for the Russians and warned Xi that there would be “implications and consequences” for China if it did so. What those might entail have not been made public, but are assumed to include “secondary sanctions” against Chinese companies thought to be acting as an intermediary for Russian firms.
From what can be determined, Xi neither acquiesced to Biden’s demands nor refused them outright. Instead, he expressed sympathy for the Ukrainians’ plight and promised Chinese aid in the country’s reconstruction. How he justified Russia’s invasion is not publicly known, but from the public summary of his remarks, he implied that the war was caused as much by the West as by Russia, and so it was up to those two sides to find a resolution. “The U.S. and NATO should also have dialogue with Russia to address the crux of the Ukraine crisis and ease the security concerns of both Russia and Ukraine,” he reportedly told Biden.
The meeting did not end in disarray and the two sides agreed to continue consulting with each other about Ukraine, so perhaps we can hope for greater progress in the future. But this meeting did not seem to narrow the divide between the two sides regarding China’s ties with Russia.
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Readout of President Joseph R. Biden Jr. Call with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China
The White House, March 18, 2022
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. spoke today with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The conversation focused on Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. President Biden outlined the views of the United States and our Allies and partners on this crisis. President Biden detailed our efforts to prevent and then respond to the invasion, including by imposing costs on Russia. He described the implications and consequences if China provides material support to Russia as it conducts brutal attacks against Ukrainian cities and civilians. The President underscored his support for a diplomatic resolution to the crisis. The two leaders also agreed on the importance of maintaining open lines of communication, to manage the competition between our two countries. The President reiterated that U.S. policy on Taiwan has not changed, and emphasized that the United States continues to oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo. The two leaders tasked their teams to follow up on today’s conversation in the critical period ahead.
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President Xi Jinping Has a Video Call with US President Joe Biden
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, March 19, 2022
On the evening of 18 March, President Xi Jinping had a video call with US President Joe Biden at the request of the latter. The two Presidents had a candid and in-depth exchange of views on China-US relations, the situation in Ukraine, and other issues of mutual interest.
President Xi noted the new major developments in the international landscape since their first virtual meeting last November. The prevailing trend of peace and development is facing serious challenges. The world is neither tranquil nor stable. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and the world’s two leading economies, China and the US must not only guide their relations forward along the right track, but also shoulder their share of international responsibilities and work for world peace and tranquility….
President Xi underscored that there have been and will continue to be differences between China and the US. What matters is to keep such differences under control. A steadily growing relationship is in the interest of both sides.
The two sides exchanged views on the situation in Ukraine.
President Biden expounded on the US position, and expressed readiness for communication with China to prevent the situation from exacerbating.
President Xi pointed out that China does not want to see the situation in Ukraine to come to this. China stands for peace and opposes war. This is embedded in China’s history and culture. China makes a conclusion independently based on the merits of each matter. China advocates upholding international law and universally recognized norms governing international relations. China adheres to the UN Charter and promotes the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. These are the major principles that underpin China’s approach to the Ukraine crisis. China has put forward a six-point initiative on the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, and is ready to provide further humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and other affected countries. All sides need to jointly support Russia and Ukraine in having dialogue and negotiation that will produce results and lead to peace. The US and NATO should also have dialogue with Russia to address the crux of the Ukraine crisis and ease the security concerns of both Russia and Ukraine.
President Xi stressed that with the need to fight COVID-19 on the one hand and protect the economy and people’s livelihood on the other, things are already very difficult for countries around the world. As leaders of major countries, we need to think about how to properly address global hotspot issues and, more importantly, keep in mind global stability and the work and life of billions of people. Sweeping and indiscriminate sanctions would only make the people suffer. If further escalated, they could trigger serious crises in global economy and trade, finance, energy, food, and industrial and supply chains, crippling the already languishing world economy and causing irrevocable losses. The more complex the situation, the greater the need to remain cool-headed and rational. Whatever the circumstances, there is always a need for political courage to create space for peace and leave room for political settlement. As two Chinese sayings go, “It takes two hands to clap.” “He who tied the bell to the tiger must take it off.”
It is imperative that the parties involved demonstrate political will and find a proper settlement in view of both immediate and long-term needs. Other parties can and should create conditions to that end. The pressing priority is to keep the dialogue and negotiation going, avoid civilian casualties, prevent a humanitarian crisis, and cease hostilities as soon as possible. An enduring solution would be for major countries to respect each other, reject the Cold War mentality, refrain from bloc confrontation, and build step by step a balanced, effective and sustainable security architecture for the region and for the world. China has been doing its best for peace and will continue to play a constructive role.
The two Presidents agreed that the video call is constructive. They directed their teams to promptly follow up and take concrete actions to put China-US relations back on the track of steady development, and make respective efforts for the proper settlement of the Ukraine crisis.
Prominent Chinese Analyst Calls on Beijing to Sever Ties with Putin
Note: On March 12, Hu Wei, a prominent academic and think-tank analyst in Shanghai, published an essay on the U.S.-China Perception Monitor, a website associated with the Carter Center in Atlanta, calling on the Chinese government to cease its support for Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. Hu Wei is the vice-chairman of the Public Policy Research Center of the Counselor’s Office of the State Council and the chairman of Shanghai Public Policy Research Association. His essay was widely circulated in China via social media before government authorities blocked access to the article and the Perception Monitor.
Along with other such commentaries circulated by Chinese analysts, Hu’s article suggests that many within China’s top policy and academic circles are appalled by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and believe that China should disassociate itself from the Putin regime or face isolation in an increasingly U.S.-dominated world. Given the importance of this conversation within China and its impact on U.S.-China relations, we publish extracts from Hu’s article below.
Possible Outcomes of the Russo-Ukrainian War and China’s Choice
US-China Perception Monitor, March 12, 2022
The Russo-Ukrainian War is the most severe geopolitical conflict since World War II and will result in far greater global consequences than September 11 attacks. At this critical moment, China needs to accurately analyze and assess the direction of the war and its potential impact on the international landscape. At the same time, in order to strive for a relatively favorable external environment, China needs to respond flexibly and make strategic choices that conform to its long-term interests.
Russia’s ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine has caused great controversy in China, with its supporters and opponents being divided into two implacably opposing sides. This article does not represent any party and, for the judgment and reference of the highest decision-making level in China, this article conducts an objective analysis on the possible war consequences along with their corresponding countermeasure options.
I. Predicting the Future of the Russo-Ukrainian War
1. Vladimir Putin may be unable to achieve his expected goals, which puts Russia in a tight spot. The purpose of Putin’s attack was to completely solve the Ukrainian problem and divert attention from Russia’s domestic crisis by defeating Ukraine with a blitzkrieg, replacing its leadership, and cultivating a pro-Russian government. However, the blitzkrieg failed, and Russia is unable to support a protracted war and its associated high costs. Launching a nuclear war would put Russia on the opposite side of the whole world and is therefore unwinnable. The situations both at home and abroad are also increasingly unfavorable. Even if the Russian army were to occupy Ukraine’s capital Kyiv and set up a puppet government at a high cost, this would not mean final victory. At this point, Putin’s best option is to end the war decently through peace talks, which requires Ukraine to make substantial concessions. However, what is not attainable on the battlefield is also difficult to obtain at the negotiating table. In any case, this military action constitutes an irreversible mistake.
2. The conflict may escalate further, and the West’s eventual involvement in the war cannot be ruled out. While the escalation of the war would be costly, there is a high probability that Putin will not give up easily given his character and power. The Russo-Ukrainian war may escalate beyond the scope and region of Ukraine, and may even include the possibility of a nuclear strike. Once this happens, the U.S. and Europe cannot stay aloof from the conflict, thus triggering a world war or even a nuclear war. The result would be a catastrophe for humanity and a showdown between the United States and Russia. This final confrontation, given that Russia’s military power is no match for NATO’s, would be even worse for Putin.
3. Even if Russia manages to seize Ukraine in a desperate gamble, it is still a political hot potato. Russia would thereafter carry a heavy burden and become overwhelmed. Under such circumstances, no matter whether Volodymyr Zelensky is alive or not, Ukraine will most likely set up a government-in-exile to confront Russia in the long term. Russia will be subject both to Western sanctions and rebellion within the territory of Ukraine. The battle lines will be drawn very long. The domestic economy will be unsustainable and will eventually be dragged down. This period will not exceed a few years.
4. The political situation in Russia may change or be disintegrated at the hands of the West. After Putin’s blitzkrieg failed, the hope of Russia’s victory is slim and Western sanctions have reached an unprecedented degree. As people’s livelihoods are severely affected and as anti-war and anti-Putin forces gather, the possibility of a political mutiny in Russia cannot be ruled out. With Russia’s economy on the verge of collapse, it would be difficult for Putin to prop up the perilous situation even without the loss of the Russo-Ukrainian war. If Putin were to be ousted from power due to civil strife, coup d’état, or another reason, Russia would be even less likely to confront the West. It would surely succumb to the West, or even be further dismembered, and Russia’s status as a great power would come to an end.
II. Analysis of the Impact of Russo-Ukrainian war On International Landscape
1. The United States would regain leadership in the Western world, and the West would become more united. At present, public opinion believes that the Ukrainian war signifies a complete collapse of U.S. hegemony, but the war would in fact bring France and Germany, both of which wanted to break away from the U.S., back into the NATO defense framework, destroying Europe’s dream to achieve independent diplomacy and self-defense. Germany would greatly increase its military budget; Switzerland, Sweden, and other countries would abandon their neutrality. With Nord Stream 2 put on hold indefinitely, Europe’s reliance on US natural gas will inevitably increase. The US and Europe would form a closer community of shared future, and American leadership in the Western world will rebound.
2. The “Iron Curtain” would fall again not only from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, but also to the final confrontation between the Western-dominated camp and its competitors. The West will draw the line between democracies and authoritarian states, defining the divide with Russia as a struggle between democracy and dictatorship. The new Iron Curtain will no longer be drawn between the two camps of socialism and capitalism, nor will it be confined to the Cold War. It will be a life-and-death battle between those for and against Western democracy. The unity of the Western world under the Iron Curtain will have a siphon effect on other countries: the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy will be consolidated, and other countries like Japan will stick even closer to the U.S., which will form an unprecedentedly broad democratic united front.
3. The power of the West will grow significantly, NATO will continue to expand, and U.S. influence in the non-Western world will increase. After the Russo-Ukrainian War, no matter how Russia achieves its political transformation, it will greatly weaken the anti-Western forces in the world. The scene after the 1991 Soviet and Eastern upheavals may repeat itself: theories on “the end of ideology” may reappear, the resurgence of the third wave of democratization will lose momentum, and more third world countries will embrace the West. The West will possess more “hegemony” both in terms of military power and in terms of values and institutions, its hard power and soft power will reach new heights.
4. China will become more isolated under the established framework. For the above reasons, if China does not take proactive measures to respond, it will encounter further containment from the US and the West. Once Putin falls, the U.S. will no longer face two strategic competitors but only have to lock China in strategic containment. Europe will further cut itself off from China; Japan will become the anti-China vanguard; South Korea will further fall to the U.S.; Taiwan will join the anti-China chorus, and the rest of the world will have to choose sides under herd mentality. China will not only be militarily encircled by the U.S., NATO, the QUAD, and AUKUS, but also be challenged by Western values and systems.
III. China’s Strategic Choice
1. China cannot be tied to Putin and needs to be cut off as soon as possible. In the sense that an escalation of conflict between Russia and the West helps divert U.S. attention from China, China should rejoice with and even support Putin, but only if Russia does not fall. Being in the same boat with Putin will impact China should he lose power. Unless Putin can secure victory with China’s backing, a prospect which looks bleak at the moment, China does not have the clout to back Russia. The law of international politics says that there are “no eternal allies nor perpetual enemies,” but “our interests are eternal and perpetual.” Under current international circumstances, China can only proceed by safeguarding its own best interests, choosing the lesser of two evils, and unloading the burden of Russia as soon as possible. At present, it is estimated that there is still a window period of one or two weeks before China loses its wiggle room. China must act decisively.
2. China should avoid playing both sides in the same boat, give up being neutral, and choose the mainstream position in the world. At present, China has tried not to offend either side and walked a middle ground in its international statements and choices, including abstaining from the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly votes. However, this position does not meet Russia’s needs, and it has infuriated Ukraine and its supporters as well as sympathizers, putting China on the wrong side of much of the world. In some cases, apparent neutrality is a sensible choice, but it does not apply to this war, where China has nothing to gain. Given that China has always advocated respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, it can avoid further isolation only by standing with the majority of the countries in the world. This position is also conducive to the settlement of the Taiwan issue.
3. China should achieve the greatest possible strategic breakthrough and not be further isolated by the West. Cutting off from Putin and giving up neutrality will help build China’s international image and ease its relations with the U.S. and the West. Though difficult and requiring great wisdom, it is the best option for the future. The view that a geopolitical tussle in Europe triggered by the war in Ukraine will significantly delay the U.S. strategic shift from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region cannot be treated with excessive optimism. There are already voices in the U.S. that Europe is important, but China is more so, and the primary goal of the U.S. is to contain China from becoming the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region. Under such circumstances, China’s top priority is to make appropriate strategic adjustments accordingly, to change the hostile American attitudes towards China, and to save itself from isolation. The bottom line is to prevent the U.S. and the West from imposing joint sanctions on China.
4. China should prevent the outbreak of world wars and nuclear wars and make irreplaceable contributions to world peace. As Putin has explicitly requested Russia’s strategic deterrent forces to enter a state of special combat readiness, the Russo-Ukrainian war may spiral out of control. A just cause attracts much support; an unjust one finds little. If Russia instigates a world war or even a nuclear war, it will surely risk the world’s turmoil. To demonstrate China’s role as a responsible major power, China not only cannot stand with Putin, but also should take concrete actions to prevent Putin’s possible adventures. China is the only country in the world with this capability, and it must give full play to this unique advantage. Putin’s departure from China’s support will most likely end the war, or at least not dare to escalate the war. As a result, China will surely win widespread international praise for maintaining world peace, which may help China prevent isolation but also find an opportunity to improve its relations with the United States and the West.
Why is China reluctant to lead mediation between Russia and Ukraine?
By Zhiqun Zhu, The Hill, March 12, 2022
[Note: Zhiqun Zhu is a professor of political science and international relations at Bucknell University and a member of the Steering Committee of the Committee for a Sane U.S. China Policy.]
As the Ukraine crisis drags on, some countries have called on China to play a leadership role in ending the war soon. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba requested China to use its influence to stop Russia’s invasion of his country. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell suggested that China is more suitable than other powers to play such a role….
There are good reasons why China should be an honest broker in this crisis. Notably, China has suffered from poor international image in recent years due to its controversial policies in Hong Kong and Xinjiang and its assertive diplomacy. Successfully mediating a major international crisis could significantly boost China’s global standing. Peace in Europe also contributes to China’s economic stability…. However, China…remains reluctant to play a major leadership role in mediation due to key internal and external constraints.
First of all, the conflict is not just between Russia and Ukraine; it is between Russia and the United States and the West in general. Western leaders and media have labeled the conflict as that between democracy and autocracy, and China has been conveniently included in the autocracy camp.
The sorry state of China’s relations with the West, and the United States in particular, gives China little desire to get deeply involved now. Russia is the only friendly country towards China among major powers at a time when a hostile Western bloc is countering China’s rise. Under current international conditions, the best one can expect from China is its distancing from Russia’s aggression at the UN and its moral support for Ukraine’s sovereignty. Out of its own national interests, China is unlikely to go further, let alone abandon Russia.
Second, it’s a politically sensitive moment in China. Barring major disruptions, Xi Jinping is expected to be confirmed for a third term as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party at the 20th Party Congress this fall and his third term as president of China in spring 2023. He seems to have strong backing within the party and does not need additional credentials from a foreign policy achievement. Mediating in a messy crisis is not guaranteed to succeed, and a failed mediation will only dent Xi’s stature at home. He will act cautiously before the extension of his leadership position is secured….
Finally, Beijing has become increasingly concerned about the future of Taiwan. Despite clear differences between Ukraine and Taiwan, both are portrayed to be at the frontlines against giant authoritarian neighbors. Judging from the swift and robust international response to Russia, Beijing fears its potential military takeover of Taiwan in the future will most likely elicit even stronger and more unified global reactions, given Taiwan’s higher strategic value to the United States.
Indeed, President Biden’s decision to dispatch a delegation headed by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen to Taiwan in the middle of the current crisis sent a powerful message of U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan…. If China feels it may lose Taiwan permanently, its knee-jerk reaction will be to become better prepared for the U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait…. Part of the justification for the Biden administration’s decision to rule out U.S. military intervention in Ukraine is to remain focused on the Indo-Pacific. It is naïve to believe that China’s mediation in a European crisis will change U.S. policy towards China or improve U.S.-China relations significantly.
The incentives for China to lead the mediation efforts in the Russia-Ukraine conflict are overwhelmed by its strategic calculations of international and domestic priorities. Like other powers, China puts its own interests first. Until China, the United States, the EU, and other major powers set aside their own interests to prioritize an end to this humanitarian disaster, the people of Ukraine are likely left in the balance.