Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control
NUCLEAR WEAPONS & ARMS CONTROL IN U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS
Although China does not possess as large a nuclear arsenal as does Russia and so has not figured as prominently in nuclear arms matters as has Russia, it (like the U.S. and Russia) is modernizing its nuclear arsenal, and this has become a matter of concern for many security analysts. Hence, while China has not previously played a significant role in nuclear arms control negotiations, many U.S. policymakers have suggested that it is time for China to join in such negotiations. The Committee will follow these developments closely and post articles and document of interest on the topic here, with the most recent appearing first.
Pentagon’s 2023 Report on China Portrays a Continuing Nuclear Buildup
Analysis by Michael Klare, Oct. 25, 2023
Every fall, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) releases its annual report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China [PRC], an unclassified assessment of Chinese military capabilities in light of recent developments. Typically, the release of these reports generate headlines in the United States and abroad, usually echoing the Pentagon’s claims of significant upgrades to China’s military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional. The release of this year’s edition, on Oct. 19, was no exception: the DoD’s claims of a major nuclear buildup by China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), generated widespread media attention.
Recent editions of the “China Report” have highlighted China’s drive to expand and enhance its nuclear retaliatory capabilities, notably by constructing hundreds of additional silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); modernizing its fleet of ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); fielding a long-range nuclear strike bomber, the H-6N; and increasing the number of nuclear warheads available for these nuclear-delivery systems.
This year’s edition reported progress in all of these areas, without noting any significant breakthroughs in any of them. Here are some of its principal findings:
· The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in 2022, which consists of at least 300 new ICBM silos, and has loaded at least some ICBMs into these silos.
· The PRC is developing new ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.
· In 2022, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion, and DoD estimates China’s stockpile had more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023 [or 100 more than it was reported to have in 2022]. [By comparison, the U.S. nuclear arsenal is contains approximately 5,200 warheads and Russia’s 5,900 warheads, according to the Stockholm International Peace Institute.]
· The PRC probably will use its new fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities to produce plutonium for its nuclear weapons program, despite publicly maintaining these technologies are intended for peaceful purposes.
As reported by the DoD, these developments suggest a mad dash by China to rapidly expand its nuclear war-fighting capabilities. However, a careful reading of this and prior-year DoD reports suggest a much slower, more methodical buildup. From the information provided in the 2023 China Report and studies by other organizations, such as the Federation of American Scientists, it appears that China aims to enhance its nuclear retaliatory capabilities so as to improve their ability to survive a U.S. “counterforce” (disarming) first strike and still strike back at U.S. territory, despite enhanced U.S. ballistic missile defenses.
Given this calculus, it is not surprising that we are seeing a slow but steady improvement in Chinese second-strike capabilities, notably the construction of additional silos, the deployment of multi-warhead ICBMs, and the development of longer-range SLBMs. But there is no evidence of a Chinese rush to complete these endeavors – just a steady improvement from year to year. (For a sober analysis of Chinese nuclear planning, see the report on “Chinese Nuclear Weapons 2023” from the Federation of American Scientists by clicking here.)
Hence, the number of deployed Chinese ICBMs is said to total approximately 350 in the 2023 edition of the China Report, just 50 more than the estimate in the 2022 edition. Moreover, the 2022 edition uses exactly the same language to describe the PLA’s development of new ICBMs as the 2023 edition, with the latter indicating no significant change from the earlier version.
Likewise, the 2023 edition makes the same claim as in the 2022 version about the possible diversion of plutonium from the fast-breeder reactors now under construction at Xiapu, claimed by China to be for civilian purposes, but provides no new evidence to support this claim.
China’s continuing nuclear buildup is, indeed, a cause for concern, as is the far more extensive modernization and enhancement of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons capabilities. All three developments point to greater danger and uncertainty in the nuclear field, and a compensating need for serious talks among the nuclear powers leading to fresh curbs on nuclear weapons stockpiles and deployments.
To see the complete DoD report on China, click here
Nuclear Notebook: Chinese nuclear weapons, 2023
Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 13, 2023
In this highly authoritative account, Hans Kristensen and his colleagues at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) describe the status of China’s drive to bolster and modernize its strategic nuclear capabilities, consisting of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-based ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range strategic bombers. According to their tally, China possesses 142 ICBMs, 72 SLBMs loaded on six submarines, and 20 long-range bombers. They further estimate that China currently possesses 410 nuclear warheads, with more in production.
In their report, Kristensen et al. see a significant Chinese drive to replace older weapons with more modern ones and to increase the number the number of delivery systems in China’s arsenal. They report…
China is continuing the nuclear weapons modernization program that it initiated in the 1990s and 2000s, but is expanding it significantly by fielding more types and greater numbers of nuclear weapons than ever before. Since our previous Nuclear Notebook on China in November 2021, China has continued to modernize its road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), has significantly advanced the construction of its three new missile silo fields for solid-fuel ICBMs, and has also expanded the construction of new silos for its liquid-fuel DF-5 ICBMs…. At sea, China apparently has refitted its six Type-094 ballistic missile submarines with the longer-range JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile. In addition, China has recently reassigned a nuclear mission to its bombers and is developing an air-launched ballistic missile that might have nuclear capability.
Much speculation has been proffered by Western analysts regarding Chinese leaders’ motives for the nuclear buildup. Historically, China has claimed that its small arsenal is intended for second-strike, retaliatory use only, to deter an enemy’s first strike. Pointing to the current Chinese buildup, some U.S. military analysts have suggested that China now seeks to duplicate the large nuclear arsenals possessed by Russia and the United States, giving it “coercive” or threatening options not currently available from its small stockpile. However, Kristensen et al. argue that it is premature to draw any such conclusions from what is known about the Chinese buildup, given its incomplete status. China’s buildup, they suggest, could simply represent a drive to ensure that its second-strike forces can better withstand a more capable U.S. first strike combined with enhanced U.S. missile defense.
[Recent Chinese moves] are not necessarily evidence of a shift to a more aggressive nuclear posture. They could just as likely be intended to ensure the survival of the forces against a surprise first strike. China has deployed silo-based DF-5s and road-mobile ICBMs for decades that in a crisis would be armed with the intention to launch them before they are destroyed. China potentially could maintain its current strategy even with many new silos and improved early-warning systems. The combination of silo-based solid-fuel missiles and early warning could be interpreted as a Chinese reaction to what it sees is an increasing risk against the survivability of its retaliatory nuclear force….
Although there has been considerable discussion in China about the size and readiness of the nuclear arsenal as well as when the no-first-use policy would apply, there is no evidence to suggest that the Chinese government has deviated from these longstanding policies. Additionally, during the October 2022 UN General Assembly First Committee session on nonproliferation, Chinese ambassador Li reaffirmed the policy: “China has solemnly committed to no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally”
For those seeking reliable, detailed information on China’s nuclear policies and capabilities, there is no better source available in the public space than this assessment by Kristensen and his colleagues. To see the complete report, click here
China denies US report it’s rapidly growing its nuclear arms
Ken Moritsugo, AP, Jan. 4, 2022
[This article reports on a press briefing in Beijing given on Jan. 4 by Fu Cong, director general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s arms control department. In the briefing, Fu denied that China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal, though he said it is taking steps to modernize its nuclear forces, to ensure its nuclear deterrent meets the minimum level necessary for national defense. Fu referred to the Pentagon’s 2021 report on China’s military strength, which claimed that Beijing aimed to have 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.]
“On the assertions made by U.S. officials that China is expanding dramatically its nuclear capabilities, first, let me say that this is untrue,” he said at the briefing.
The U.S. has also raised concern about analyst reports based on satellite imagery that China is building missile silos in its northwestern desert…. Fu would not confirm the missile silos but said the size of China’s nuclear force should not be estimated based on the satellite photos.
He said China does need to take steps to make sure its nuclear force is sufficient in light of a changing security environment in Asia. He cited U.S. talk of deploying intermediate-range non-nuclear missiles in the region.
[Fu also reiterated the Chinese position that it would not join nuclear arms reduction talks between the U.S. and Russia, as proposed by the Trump administration. He called on both countries to reduce their arsenals, which greatly exceed those of China.]
“We will be happy to join if they have reduced to our level,” he said. adding that “the two superpowers need to…drastically reduce their nuclear capabilities to a level comparable to the level of China, and for that matter to the level of France and the U.K., so that other nuclear states can join in this process.”
China Joins France, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S. in Pledging to Avoid Nuclear War:
Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races
White House Briefing Room, January 3, 2022
[Note: the following statement, signed by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, was written to coincide with the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), scheduled to begin on January 3, 2022. Because of the Covid flareup in New York City, the NPT Review Conference has been postponed to a later date.]
The People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America consider the avoidance of war between Nuclear-Weapon States and the reduction of strategic risks as our foremost responsibilities.
We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences, we also affirm that nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war. We believe strongly that the further spread of such weapons must be prevented.
We reaffirm the importance of addressing nuclear threats and emphasize the importance of preserving and complying with our bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control agreements and commitments. We remain committed to our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, including our Article VI obligation “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
We each intend to maintain and further strengthen our national measures to prevent unauthorized or unintended use of nuclear weapons. We reiterate the validity of our previous statements on de-targeting, reaffirming that none of our nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other State.
We underline our desire to work with all states to create a security environment more conducive to progress on disarmament with the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. We intend to continue seeking bilateral and multilateral diplomatic approaches to avoid military confrontations, strengthen stability and predictability, increase mutual understanding and confidence, and prevent an arms race that would benefit none and endanger all. We are resolved to pursue constructive dialogue with mutual respect and acknowledgment of each other’s security interests and concerns.
Placing “Guardrails” on the US-China Nuclear Competition
~ A failure to challenge inflated claims about China’s nuclear arsenal will have serious and painful consequences
Michael T. Klare, theNation.com, Nov. 29, 2021
Historically, talk of nuclear arms racing has applied almost exclusively to the United States and the Soviet Union, and now Russia. Indeed, the U.S. and Russia still possess the overwhelming majority of the world’s nuclear warheads, along with its most advanced nuclear delivery systems. But now China—long a minor player in the nuclear arena—appears to be bolstering its capabilities, while the United States is developing new weapons with the Chinese, as well as the Russians, in mind. The risk of a war between the U.S. and China has also been growing, especially due to tensions over Taiwan, increasing the danger of nuclear weapons use.
Fueling these dangerous trends is a steady stream of alarmist pronouncements by U.S. officials about China’s nuclear buildup. The Chinese are engaged in a “remarkable expansion of [their] nuclear and strategic capabilities,” Adm. Charles A. Richard, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, told the House Armed Services Committee last April.
But while China is certainly undertaking the modernization of its relatively old and meager nuclear arsenal—as compared to those of Russia and the United States—it can hardly be described as undertaking a “remarkable expansion” of its arsenal.
For starters, bear in mind that China currently maintains a relatively modest nuclear arsenal. In its latest tally of world nuclear stockpiles, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) calculated that China possessed approximately 350 nuclear warheads—a bit more than the number deployed by France (290), but a very small fraction of the 5,550 warheads possessed by the U.S. and the 6,375 by Russia.
That China maintains such a modest strategic arsenal has long provided confirmation for Beijing’s claim that it seeks nuclear armaments solely to implement a “minimum deterrence” posture—one that requires sufficient weapons to survive an enemy first strike and deliver intolerable damage on the attacker but not enough to conduct a disarming first strike on an adversary.
China’s arsenal has remained relatively unchanged for several decades, but now is being substantially modernized—allowing US military officials to claim that it is engaged in a major expansion along with a shift in its weapons employment doctrine.
[However], the evidence for a vast and rapid buildup in Chinese nuclear capabilities is underwhelming, to say the least. Also lacking is any indication that Beijing has abandoned its “minimum deterrence” strategy. What recent Chinese developments do suggest, however, is that Chinese officials fear that their existing nuclear force is becoming increasingly vulnerable to a first strike—sometimes called a “counterforce” strike—and so must be strengthened in order to safeguard its retaliatory capability.
To read the complete article, click here
China’s Hypersonic Missile Test: How Threatening?
Analysis by Michael Klare, Co-Founder, Committee for a Sane U.S.-China Policy, Nov. 1, 2021
On Oct. 16, 2021, the Financial Times reported that in August of this year, China flight-tested a hybrid missile system composed of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) fitted with a hypersonic re-entry vehicle. The ballistic missile, it was reported, circled the globe before re-entering the Earth’s atmosphere and releasing the glide vehicle, which then maneuvered its way towards its intended target.
“China tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile in August that circled the globe before speeding towards its target,” the Financial Times reported. “Five people familiar with the test said the Chinese military launched a rocket that carried a hypersonic glide vehicle which flew through low-orbit space before cruising down towards its target.”
Although the various technologies employed in the test have been employed by the major powers for some time now, the unique melding of the technologies and the sophistication of the test was said to catch U.S. military observers by surprise. “I don’t know if it’s quite a Sputnik moment, but I think it’s very close to that,” said Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Oct. 27, making it clear he and other officials were surprised. The tests, he said, were a “very significant technological event,” adding, “it has all of our attention.”
What seems to have troubled U.S. military observers most is that the test demonstrated a potential Chinese capability to evade U.S. missile defense and deliver a nuclear warhead at any spot on U.S. territory. At present, U.S. ballistic missile defenses – notably the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, with missile batteries in Alaska and California – are largely aimed out across the Pacific. Although Pentagon officials claim that the GMD system is primarily designed to intercept North Korean ICBMs, the Chinese evidently fear that if expanded over time, it could be used to intercept China’s small number of ICBMs if they were fired in response to a U.S. pre-emptive assault on China’s nuclear arsenal.
By firing an ICBM into an orbital trajectory – a method sometimes called a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, or FOBS – China can presumably evade those Pacific-oriented defenses and strike the U.S. from any direction. The addition of a maneuverable hypersonic warhead, capable of flying more than five times the speed of sound and of zig-zagging to evade enemy interceptor missiles, would provide such a weapon with additional capacity to overcome U.S. missile defenses.
Many U.S. politicians viewed the Chinese test as evidence of a vigorous Chinese drive to enhance its nuclear strike capabilities and one that must be countered with fresh U.S. military initiatives. “China’s capabilities are extraordinary,” said Sen. Michael Bennet (D-Colo.) on Oct. 18. “We have a lot of work to do to make sure that we’re defending the United States of America in the case of potential aggression. I hope it never comes to that but we need to make sure that we’ve got a strategy and approach to neutralize these threats as they arise.”
But other analysts were less alarmed by the August event, saying that China has long been testing the technologies involved in the August experiment and that if its purpose was to outwit U.S. missile defenses, that wouldn’t take much effort as the GMD system is notoriously ineffective. “The system has not been tested at all since March 2019, [and] three of its last six tests were failures,” wrote nuclear weapons expert Fred Kaplan at Slate. “That’s not exactly a formidable defense system to begin with, especially since the tests were planned well ahead of time, so that the technical crews knew exactly when, and from where, the mock warheads would appear in the sky.”
If the August test demonstrates anything, it is that China is worried about the vulnerabilities of its relatively small second-strike retaliatory nuclear arsenal to a U.S. pre-emptive strike, and is taking steps – still of an experimental nature – to reduce those vulnerabilities. The prudent U.S. response would be to seek agreements with China on the limitations of both sides’ nuclear strike capabilities while China’s are still modest, rather than to ignite an arms race with China that will cost colossal amounts of money and make the U.S. no safer than it was before. [END]
China’s Nuclear Buildup in Perspective:
Many Empty Holes in the Desert, But No Rush to Overtake the U.S.
Analysis by Michael Klare, Co-Founder, Committee for a Sane U.S.-China Policy, Sept. 6, 2021
(Note: This represents an updated version of an analysis first posted here on July 7, 2021)
On June 30, 2021, the Washington Post published an article on China’s nuclear weapons modernization program with the eye-catching title, “China is Building More than 100 New Missile Silos in its Western Desert, Analysts Say.” The article went to say that researchers at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif., had identified up to 120 holes in a stretch of desert near the northwestern city of Yumen, in Gansu province, that bore the characteristics of Chinese nuclear missile silos located elsewhere. The impression given by the article was that China was rapidly expanding its fleet of nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), posing a severe threat to U.S. security.
The Post article produced a flurry of alarmist comments in the military and conservative media suggesting a massive buildup of China’s nuclear weapons capabilities. This hullabaloo grew louder in July, when the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) reported the discovery of a second large silo field under construction, in a remote desert area of eastern Xinjiang province. This site, the FAS reported, encompassed some 110 silo holes.
With some 230 missile silos now under construction in Gansu and Xinjiang – and signs of a third field under construction near Ordos City in Inner Mongolia – talk of a Chinese nuclear buildup has reached a fever pitch. “The breathtaking growth and strategic nuclear capability enables China to change their posture and their strategy,” Adm. Charles Richard, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, told industry officials on August 12. “They are building the capacity to execute any plausible nuclear employment strategy – the last brick in the wall of a military capable of coercion.”
Let’s be clear: the only “growth” and “inflation” of the Chinese ICBM force that has been identified is of holes in the ground. No increase in the number of deployed Chinese nuclear missiles has been reported, whether by government or non-government sources. All that we know for sure is that the Chinese are building more missile silos.
The question thus arises, Why are the Chinese building more missile silos?
For Admiral Richards and other U.S. military officials, the answer is obvious: China is planning to build more ICBMs to go in the silos, giving them a greater capacity to attack the United States in a crisis, or to threaten such an attack (the “coercion” in Richards’ comment). But while it is true that China has developed some new silo-based ICBMs, notably the D-5C and DF-41 missiles, there is no evidence that it is mass-producing them on anywhere near the scale that would enable them to fill all those holes in the ground. According to the FAS’s most recent tally of Chinese nuclear forces, China has yet to deploy any D-5Cs and had deployed only 18 DF-41s for testing purposes by the end of 2020 and deployment of combat versions was proceeding slowly.
If China is not hurrying to fill those holes with missiles, what, then, is going on there?
To better understand China’s nuclear decision-making, let’s begin with the basics. Chinese military doctrine holds that China will never launch a nuclear first strike and that it only possesses nuclear weapons to deter a first strike on its territory by a hostile power. In accordance with this “no first use” policy, it has never built a nuclear force capable of destroying U.S. or Russian nuclear attack forces in a so-called “counterforce” first strike, but instead has fielded a much smaller arsenal intended for a retaliatory second strike, should it come under attack itself. For this strategy to succeed, however, China must be assured that its relatively modest nuclear force can withstand an enemy’s disarming first strike and still fire back – a condition some have termed “assured retaliation.” (See Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2015, pp. 7–50.)
In line with its “no first use” doctrine, China maintains a relatively small nuclear stockpile when compared to those of the other major nuclear powers. According to June 2021 figures published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China currently possesses approximately 350 nuclear warheads (a slight increase over the 2020 figure), compared to 5,550 for the United States and 6,255 for Russia.
As for nuclear delivery systems, China is said by the FAS to possess 92 ICBMs capable of reaching the continental U.S., comprised of 20 silo-based DF-5A and DF-5B missiles along with 72 road-mobile DF-31A and DF-31AG missiles. (This compares with the 400 Minuteman-III ICBMs in the U.S. arsenal and the 330 or so ICBMs in the Russian inventory.)
Many of the ICBMs in China’s arsenal are quite old and obsolete – the DF-5A, for example, dates from 1981 and is liquid-fueled, requiring a slow fueling process prior to launch. Not surprisingly, then, the Chinese appear to be engaged in a gradual effort to replace its older missiles with more modern designs, such as the DF-5C and DF-41 – both of which are solid-fueled (allowing rapid launch) and are believed to be capable of carrying multiple, independently-targetable warheads (MIRVs).
China also deploys several dozen JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) aboard four Type-094 missile-carrying submarines. These are now being replaced by the more modern Type-096 submarine and the JL-3 SLBM, which is assumed to carry a MIRVed warhead and Type-096 submarine, the FAS reports. These will be equipped with a more modern ballistic missile, the JL-3.
Recent analysis of China’s nuclear modernization program by Chinese and Western scholars suggest that Beijing is being driven in part by worries over the reliability of older systems in its existing arsenal, such as the DF-5A ICBM and the Type-094 submarine, and to a greater extent by concerns over the vulnerability of its relatively small ICBM force to a counterforce strike by the United States or, conceivably, Russia. Current and planned improvements in the accuracy of U.S. and Russian missiles and in the tracking systems used to locate road-mobile weapons could, Chinese leaders fear, erase China’s ability to deter a U.S. (or Russian) first strike through possession of a second-strike capability. China’s leaders are also said to be worried that future improvements in U.S. anti-missile defense systems, such as the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, could destroy the few Chinese missiles that might survive such a U.S. counterforce attack.
As noted by Gerald C. Brown in the June 2021 issue of Arms Control Today, “Revolutions in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies, coupled with advances in conventional precision weapons, have long rendered China’s nuclear forces vulnerable.” Moreover, “The U.S. ballistic missile defense program threatens to intercept any surviving retaliatory force, further jeopardizing China’s retaliatory capability.” As a consequence, “[China] seems to be moving toward a survivable nuclear force capable of executing a second strike…and [enabling] its missiles being able to penetrate U.S. missile defense systems.”
This could help explain the construction of all those silos and the development of MIRVed warheads. By dispersing a small number of ICBMs in those silo fields and moving them around frequently, China could cause uncertainty in the mind of any potential attacker as to the location of China’s ICBM force at any given time, thereby frustrating a disarming first-strike or forcing the attacker to waste hundreds of warheads in an attempt to destroy a few Chinese weapons. There’s “a very good chance that China is planning a shell game,” said Jeffrey Lewis of the Center for Nonproliferation studies in that June 30 Washington Post article on the Gansu silo field.
The introduction of MIRVed warheads on its ICBMs and SLBMs also suggests an effort by China to overcome future U.S. missile defenses. Given their small ICBM force, Chinese leaders may fear that a future U.S. (or Russian) counterforce strike could destroy much of their second-strike deterrence capability and that U.S. missile defenses could intercept the few Chinese ICBMs that survived – rendering China’s nuclear deterrent impotent. By carrying multiple warheads, this interpretation assumes, the few Chinese missiles that survived a U.S. first strike and U.S. missile defenses would be able to destroy many U.S. targets, hence bolstering deterrence.
When examined closely, therefore, China’s modernization program does not suggest a drive to vastly increase the size and strength of its nuclear arsenal, but rather a slow and calculated effort to eliminate vulnerabilities in its second-strike capabilities and better enhance China’s ability to deter a first strike by the United States.
Why the Air Force’s Plan for Fighting China Could Make Nuclear War More Likely
Loren Thompson, Forbes, June 15, 2021
NOTE: In this article, Loren Thompson, a senior contributor to Forbes, argues that U.S. plans for a future war with China over Taiwan are inherently escalatory as they entail early strikes on key Chinese assets (missile batteries, radar stations, command-and-control facilities) by nuclear-capable bombers (B-52s and, in the near future, B-21s), leaving Chinese commanders with no way to determine if they are being attacked with nuclear or conventional weapons, possibly leading them to resort to the early use of nuclear weapons by their side. The U.S., possibly fearing such strikes, would be incentivized to attack Chinese nuclear capabilities at the very onset of a conflict – presumably with conventional weapons, but launched from dual-use platforms – adding to Chinese leaders’ fears and uncertainty and heightening the risk of escalation.
If a fight over Taiwan occurs, the U.S. Air Force plans to wage conventional warfare against China by flying nuclear-capable aircraft into its airspace—or by launching cruise missiles from outside its airspace from other nuclear-capable aircraft. Either way, Beijing would have no quick way of determining whether the attacking U.S. bombers were carrying nuclear or conventional munitions.
Its nascent strategic warning system would not be able to differentiate between a nuclear and non-nuclear attack until weapons actually started exploding on its territory, and China’s highly centralized nuclear command authority might not be willing to wait that long before responding. After all, it could be the first target of the attack.
Whichever estimate you believe, the number of warheads Beijing relies on to deter a nuclear attack is a small fraction of the number available to U.S. forces, so the possibility that Washington might move to disarm Chinese strategic forces in a fight over Taiwan could not be discounted.
Since most of the missiles threatening the U.S. are road-mobile, it would be logical for Chinese leaders to assume that stealthy bombers might be sent to track down ICBMs and take out the handful of other Chinese strategic systems (four submarines, a few bombers) capable of targeting America.
As the Air Force’s fiscal 2022 Posture Statement observes, “The B-21 will possess the range, access, and payload to penetrate the most highly-contested threat environments and hold any target around the world at risk.” That includes China’s nuclear weapons, its early warning radars, and strategic command network. Faced with this possibility in a war where Chinese and U.S. forces are already fighting, Beijing might decide it needs to launch its long-range missiles before they are destroyed on the ground.
Understanding the Risks and Realities of China’s Nuclear Forces
Gerald C. Brown, Arms Control Today, June 2021
NOTE: In this thoroughly documented article, Gerald C. Brown, an analyst with Valiant Integrated Services focusing on nuclear deterrence and East Asian security, provides a comprehensive analysis of Chinese nuclear doctrine and the implications of recent enhancements to the Chinese nuclear arsenal. In essence, Brown argues that Chinese leaders seek above all to preserve a secure deterrent to a U.S. nuclear first strike, but fear that recent U.S. investments in ballistic missile defense and enhanced conventional attack with precision-guided weapons have eroded the reliability of China’s second-strike retaliatory capability. The recent enhancements to Chinese capabilities, such as the deployment of missiles with multiple re-entry vehicles (MIRV) warheads, should be viewed as a response to these U.S. developments, Brown argues. We provide excerpts from his article below, but recommend the entire article for those wishing to know more about Chinese nuclear forces and doctrine.
Unlike Russia and the United States, China has found nuclear weapons to be of rather limited utility in war-fighting. It built what it describes as a “lean and effective” nuclear deterrent, with the intentions of deterring a nuclear attack and preventing nuclear coercion.[1] Strategists in Beijing have long thought that the destructive force of nuclear weapons limits their utility, while conventional forces are more flexible and usable in conflict. Conventional forces are thought to be where wars are won or lost.[2] In that sense, China’s nuclear forces are intended to check U.S. nuclear dominance while winning conventional conflicts at lower levels of escalation. To make that happen, China is seeking to build a nuclear force capable of surviving a nuclear first strike and retaliating with an unacceptable level of damage. Experts have perhaps best described China’s nuclear strategy as one of “assured retaliation.”[3] Instead of seeking parity with other nuclear states and being able to engage in counterforce campaigns, China finds it sufficient to maintain a more modest, secure, and survivable force. If China can sufficiently absorb a first strike and retaliate, even with only a few warheads, Beijing believes an adversary is unlikely to decide that the risk of attacking China is worth the benefit….
As the U.S. annual [China] threat assessment [for 2021] noted, there are signs of recent substantial changes in Chinese nuclear forces. The most important changes have been primarily qualitative, [involving a slow increase in the number of Chinese nuclear warheads, from approximately 200 to 300], but notable quantitative changes are also occurring. These are understandably alarming to U.S. policymakers….
Yet, understanding these changes in the context of China’s nuclear strategy is important. Instead of trying to reach parity with or exceed the U.S. nuclear arsenal, China seems intent on ensuring that it has an assured retaliatory capability following U.S. strikes. Given U.S. nuclear and technological superiority, China likely has never had a sufficiently survivable nuclear deterrent against the United States, a goal that was more aspirational than anything else. Revolutions in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies, coupled with advances in conventional precision weapons, have long rendered China’s nuclear forces vulnerable. The U.S. ballistic missile defense program threatens to intercept any surviving retaliatory force, further jeopardizing China’s retaliatory capability.
For the first time in history, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seems to be moving toward a survivable nuclear force capable of executing a second strike. Research suggests that Chinese nuclear expansions and modernization are oriented toward creation of a more mobile and redundant force that can survive U.S. counterforce capabilities, including conventional systems such as the Conventional Prompt Global Strike system, and its missiles being able to penetrate U.S. missile defense systems.[10] Consequently, although China’s nuclear force size will expand, it does not appear likely to expand to the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the near future.
There is understandable doubt about the claim of China doubling its nuclear arsenal, but it does not appear to be out of the question. China is fielding an increasing number of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle weapons, such as the DF-5B deployed in 2015 and the recently deployed DF-5C and DF-41, that improve the ability of China’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) arsenal to penetrate the U.S. missile defense system.[11]
China’s shift to a nuclear triad will further increase the number of its nuclear warheads as these new systems are equipped. China is creating a more survivable nuclear submarine force, expanding the number of Type 094 ballistic missile submarines and developing the quieter Type 096 submarine with the JL-3 sea-launched ballistic missile as a complement. The PLA Air Force is also adopting a nuclear mission by developing a new air-launched ballistic missile that may be nuclear capable, as well as the nuclear-capable H-20 strategic bomber.[13]
Endnotes:
1. M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), pp. 243–247.
2. Michael Chase, “PLA Rocket Force: Executors of China’s Nuclear Strategy and Policy,” in China’s Evolving Military Strategy, ed. Joe McReynolds (Washington: The Jamestown Foundation, 2017), p. 144; Liu Chong, “The Relationship Between Nuclear Weapons and Conventional Military Conflicts,” in Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking, ed. Li Bin and Tong Zhao (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), 2016), pp. 153–159.
3. M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010): 48-87; Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 2 (October 2015): 7–50.
10. Cunningham and Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation,” pp. 15–23.
11. Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 76, No. 6 (November 1, 2020): 445.
13. Hans M. Kristensen, “China’s Strategic Systems and Programs,” in China’s Strategic Arsenal: Worldview, Doctrine, and Systems, ed. James M. Smith and Paul J. Bolt (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2021), pp. 108–112.
Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020
Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 7, 2020
NOTE: In a recent issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda of the Federation of American Scientists published a new estimate of Chinese nuclear forces. Kristensen and Korda have been publishing such estimates for many years, and their findings are widely considered among the most reliable available in the open-source literature.
According to their report, China “has a produced a stockpile of approximately 350 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 272 are for delivery by more than 240 operational land-based ballistic missiles, 48 sea-based ballistic missiles, and 20 nuclear gravity bombs assigned to bombers. The remaining 78 warheads are intended to arm additional land- and sea-based missiles that are in the process of being fielded. This estimate is higher than the “low-200” warheads reported by the Pentagon in its 2020 report to Congress [Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020]; however, the Pentagon’s estimate only refers to “operational” Chinese nuclear warheads, and therefore presumably excludes warheads that are attributed to newer weapons still in development.”
Regarding Chinese land-based missile forces, they have this to say: “China is continuing the gradual modernization of its land-based, nuclear-capable missile force. Overall, we estimate that the PLA Rocket Force possesses approximately 240 land-based missiles that can deliver nuclear warheads. Of those, about 150 can hit some part of the United States with some 190 warheads. The number of ICBMs that can hit the continental United States is lower: about 90 missiles with approximately 130 warheads. The Pentagon anticipates that the number of ICBM warheads capable of threatening the United States might increase to roughly 200 by 2025 (2020 report cited above). Most of China’s ballistic missiles – about 250 – are medium- and intermediate-range missiles intended for regional missions, and most of those are not nuclear. We estimate there are about 60 nuclear warheads assigned to these regional missiles.”
Also, “China’s current ICBM modernization program, which began in the 1990s, is part of a transition from older, transportable, liquid-fuel, slow-launching missiles to longer-range, road-mobile, solid-fuel, quicker launching missiles.”
On missile-carrying submarines: “China has launched six Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which are based at the Longposan naval base near Yulin on Hainan Island. Only four are currently operational. The two newest SSBNs – which were handed over to the PLA Navy in April 2020 – are believed to be variants of the original Type 094 design, and known as the Type 094A.”
And, regarding bombers, “We estimate that for years China has maintained a small inventory of gravity bombs – perhaps up to 20 – for potential contingency use by aircraft, even though it only recently has begun to reassign a formal nuclear mission to PLAAF [PLA Air Force] units. In addition to the gravity bombs, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported in 2016 that China was developing two air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs) for the H-6 bomber, “one of which might include a nuclear payload.”
Their report includes considerably more information and is accompanied by data-packed tables. For the full article, click on the article title above.
When testifying about the nuclear threats to the United States, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) usually begins with a discussion of Russia’s large nuclear arsenal. After all, according to the most recent assessments, Russia is believed to possess approximately 4,135 nuclear warheads in its active stockpile (of which 1,373 are thought to be deployed on ICBMs or other strategic delivery systems). China, by contrast, is thought to possess about 320 warheads, just 30 more than France. Yet, in his April 20, 2021 statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen. Charles A. Richard chose to highlight the nuclear threat from China above all, describing it in alarmist terms well out of proportion to its actual capability. We provide excerpts from his testimony as a public service. But many of his assertions clash with the authoritative assessments in “China’s Nuclear Forces 2020,” from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Excerpts from that article can be found further below; for the full article, click here
Here are the excerpts from Richard’s testimony:
Under a veil of secrecy, China continues to advance comprehensive military modernization programs for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), building a robust lethal force with capabilities spanning all domains. This modernization includes nuclear weapons and forces, and supports longstanding goals to establish regional hegemony, deny U.S. power projection in the Indo-Pacific region, and supplant the United States as the security partner of choice. While China’s nuclear stockpile is currently smaller (but undergoing an unprecedented expansion) than those fielded by Russia and the United States, the size of a nation’s weapons stockpile is a crude measure of its overall strategic capability. To fully assess the China threat, it is also necessary to consider the capability of the associated delivery system, command and control, readiness, posture, doctrine and training. By these measures, China is already capable of executing any plausible nuclear employment strategy within their region and will soon be able to do so at intercontinental ranges as well. They are no longer a “lesser included case” of the pacing nuclear threat, Russia.
These capabilities bring into question China’s stated “No First Use” policy declaration and implied minimum deterrent strategy. Behind a complete lack of transparency, China is rapidly improving its strategic nuclear capability and capacity, with rapid growth in road mobile production, doubling the numbers of launchers in some ICBM brigades, deployment of solid fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos on a potentially large-scale, an added air leg, and are well ahead of the pace necessary to double their nuclear stockpile by the end of the decade. This is all in keeping with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 14th Five-Year Plan’s (2021-2025) call to “strengthen strategic forces” and “accelerate the creation of high-level strategic deterrence.”
In the very near-term China will possess a credible nuclear triad, supported by its growing stockpile and weapon systems capable of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). The PLA is developing and fielding precision strike nuclear delivery systems such as the dual use DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and survivable road-mobile ICBMs with the CSS-10 mod 2 (DF-31A) class missile capable of striking locations within the continental United States. The CSS-20 (DF-41) became operational last year, and China has stood up at least two brigades. Enhancing the PLA Air Force’s newly reassigned nuclear mission, the redesigned H-6N is capable of carrying a nuclear capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) and conducting air-to-air refueling for greater range and flexibility. China’s six, second-generation JIN-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) with JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) provide a viable sea-based deterrent capable of maintaining continuous at-sea presence.
While China keeps the majority of its forces in a peacetime status, increasing evidence suggests China has moved a portion of its nuclear force to a Launch on Warning (LOW) posture and are adopting a limited “high alert duty” strategy. To support this, China continues to prioritize improved space-based strategic early warning, and command and control as specific nuclear force modernization goals. Their networked and integrated platform advancements will enable skip-echelon decision-making processes and greater rapid reaction. This shifting posture is particularly unsettling, considering the immature nature of Chinese strategic forces and compressed timelines needed to assess and frame a response, increasing the potential for error and miscalculation. Collectively, China’s strategic nuclear modernization expansion raises troubling concerns and complements the conventional capability growth reported by INDOPACOM and other Combatant Commands.
Revamping Nuclear Arms Control: Five Near-Term Proposals
James M. Acton, Thomas D. MacDonald, and Pranay Vaddi, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2020
Arguing that any major nuclear arms control agreements between the U.S. and China, or trilateral U.S.-China-Russia agreements will prove difficult to negotiate in the current political environment and could take years to adopt, three experts from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) have proposed five reasonably attainable near-term agreements that would not require cuts in existing stockpiles or other problematic commitments. Three of their five proposals involve possible U.S.-Russian agreements, one involves a trilateral proposal, and one a possible U.S.-China agreement.
Their trilateral U.S.-China-Russia proposal is for a Trilateral Ballistic Missile Notification Agreement, obliging the three signatory states to provide advance notification to the others of forthcoming ballistic missile tests and space launches. Such notification, they argue, would reduce the risk that preparations for a launch might be interpreted by an adversary – especially during a time of crisis – as preparations for an actual attack, leading to precipitous military action on its part and possible nuclear escalation.
The authors assert that such an agreement should be relatively easy to negotiate as the U.S. and Russia already have such an agreement, the 1988 U.S.-Soviet Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement, which was made legally binding through its incorporation into New START (which was just extended for another five years), and China and Russia signed their own legally binding notification agreement in 2009.
Their other, bilateral proposal is for a Chinese-U.S. Fissile Material Management Regime, entailing a joint declaration by Washington and Beijing of a cutoff in weapons-related fissile material production and the adoption of transparency measures to enhance the cutoff’s credibility. Such a measure would be especially attractive to Washington, as it would provide reassurance that China is not planning a significant increase in its nuclear weapons stockpile, as some analysts have claimed.
According to the authors, such an agreement is within the realm of possibility as there are widespread reports that China has ceased production of weapons-usable fissile material (separated plutonium and highly enriched plutonium) and the United States has unilaterally announced a cutoff in such production. If both countries agree to jointly declare a cutoff in fissile materials production, they could then discuss means of verification which could prove relatively easy to adopt.
For a PDF of the complete report, click here.
Forging 21st-Century Strategic Deterrence
By Admiral Charles A. Richard, U.S. Navy
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2021
Note: In an unusually blunt opinion piece, Adm. Charles A. Richard, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which oversees all U.S. nuclear weapons delivery forces, warned that “the U.S. military must shift its principal assumption from ‘nuclear employment [in a war with China/and or Russia] is not possible’ to ‘nuclear employment is a very real possibility,’ and act to meet and deter that reality. Below are some excerpts from the article.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Department of Defense (DoD) has not had to consider the possibility of great power competition, crisis, or direct armed conflict with a nuclear-capable peer. Unfortunately, the current environment no longer affords us that luxury….
While DoD’s focus has been on counterterrorism, Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have begun to aggressively challenge international norms and global peace using instruments of power and threats of force in ways not seen since the height of the Cold War—and in some cases, in ways not seen during the Cold War, such as cyberattacks and threats in space…. These behaviors are destabilizing, and if left unchecked, increase the risk of great power crisis or conflict. We must actively compete to hold their aggression in check; ceding to their initiatives risks reinforcing their perceptions that the United States is unwilling or unable to respond, which could further embolden them.
The strategic capabilities of our competitors continue to grow, and they are sobering. More than a decade ago, Russia began aggressively modernizing its nuclear forces, including its non-treaty-accountable medium- and short-range systems. It is modernizing bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, warning systems, command-and-control (C2) capabilities, and the doctrine to underpin their employment—in short, its entire strategic force structure.
The People’s Republic of China is also on a trajectory to be a strategic peer and should not be mistaken as a “lesser included” case. Like Russia, it acts aggressively to challenge democratic values and shape the global economic order to its benefit. China continues to make technological leaps in capabilities in every domain. Across its conventional weapons systems, it continues to invest significant resources in hypersonic and advanced missile systems, as well as to expand its space and counter-space capabilities. Its advances in space provide better C2 of its forces worldwide and enhance their situational awareness….
The PRC also continues to invest heavily in its nuclear capabilities. Its strategic dyad of ICBMs and SLBMs will soon become a triad, with the completion of a nuclear-capable long-range bomber. China is building new land-based, road-mobile ICBMs, providing its forces more flexibility and capability. The PLA Navy Jin-class ballistic-missile submarines carry up to 12 SLBMs each. China has built new warning and C2 capabilities and improved its readiness. Further, China’s nuclear weapons stockpile is expected to double (if not triple or quadruple) over the next decade.
Acting in a responsible manner is incumbent upon any great power. For China, we must pay attention to PRC’s actions more than its stated policies. While the PRC has maintained a “No First Use” policy since the 1960s—contending it will never use a nuclear weapon first—its buildup of advanced capabilities should give us pause. This policy could change in the blink of an eye. Beijing is pursuing capabilities and operating in a manner inconsistent with a minimum deterrent strategy, giving it a full range of options, including limited use and a first-strike capability.
Faced with Russia and China’s growing threats and gray zone actions, the United States must take action today to position itself for the future. We must start by acknowledging that our most fundamental assumption—that strategic deterrence will hold, even through crisis and conflict—is going to be tested in ways not seen before. This assumption is the foundation on which we built strategies, plans, and capabilities. Unfortunately, our opponents invested in nuclear and strategic capabilities designed to constrain U.S. actions, test our alliances, and, if necessary, escalate past us—to include nuclear use. There is a real possibility that a regional crisis with Russia or China could escalate quickly to a conflict involving nuclear weapons, if they perceived a conventional loss would threaten the regime or state. Consequently, the U.S. military must shift its principal assumption from “nuclear employment is not possible” to “nuclear employment is a very real possibility,” and act to meet and deter that reality.
China’s Expanding Missile Training Area: More Silos, Tunnels, and Support Facilities
Hans Kristensen. Federation of American Scientists, February 24, 2021
This report, by Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, relies on recent satellite data to examine construction activity at China’s Jilantai ICBM training area. According to Kristensen, it suggests that the Chinese are experimenting with new missile launch options in the face of increased nuclear threats from the United States. Below are some excerpts from Kristensen’s report.
The Chinese military appears to be significantly expanding the number of ballistic missiles silos under construction in a new sprawling training area in the northern part of central China. Recent satellite images indicate that at least 16 silos are under construction, a significant expansion in just a few years since a silo was first described in the area.
The training area, located east of the city of Jilantai in the Inner Mongolia province, is used by the People’s Republic of China Rocket Force (PLARF) to train missile crews and fine-tune procedures for operating road-mobile missile launchers and their support vehicles….
One of the most important new developments in the Jilantai training area is the construction of a significant number of facilities that appear to be silos intended for ballistic missiles. In the future we might see missile test launches from these silos….
China currently operates 18-20 silos, a number that could nearly double with the construction of the silos in the Jilantai training area. Whereas as the existing silos are large to accommodate the old liquid-fueled DF-5 ICBM, all but one of the new silos at Jilantai are smaller and appear designed to accommodate the newer and slimmer solid-fuel ICBMs, such as the DF-41 (and potentially DF-31A)….
It should be pointed out that even if China doubles or triples the number of ICBM silos, it would only constitute a fraction of the number of ICBM silos operated by the United States and Russia. The US Air Force has 450 silos, of which 400 are loaded. Russia has about 130 operational silos.
Noting that the silo construction at Jilantai “so far is not about achieving parity with the United States (or even near-parity),” Kristensen speculates on several possible motives for the increase in silo construction, including reduced exposure to a U.S. first strike on China’s nuclear forces; a transition from liquid-fueled (DF-5) to solid-fueled (DF-41) ICBMs; and, as a result of that transition, allowing for more rapid arming and launch of ICBMs.