Taiwan

TAIWAN, THE U.S., & CHINA

U.S. relations with Taiwan play an important part in the U.S.-China relationship and have become a source of growing friction between the two countries. The Committee will follow these developments closely and post articles and documents of interest on the topic, with the most recent appearing first.

For a Factsheet on the “One China” Policy, prepared by Zhu Zhiqun of the Sane Committee’s Steering Committee, click here

For a commentary on the implications of the Ukraine war for Chinese thinking about a possible invasion of Taiwan by Michael Klare, Sane Committee co-chair, click here

Taiwan’s Elections: Implications for China-Taiwan and China-U.S. Relations

Analysis by Zhiqun Zhu, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Bucknell University
[Note: This article first appeared at Think China, Jan. 22, 2024] 

Taiwan’s January 13 presidential and legislative elections garnered much global attention as they have significant implications for cross-Taiwan Strait relations and US-China relations. Now that the dust has settled, here are some takeaways. 

Some victory for each of the major players 

First of all, Taiwan’s 2024 elections are unique in which all parties involved could claim some victory. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its candidate Lai Ching-te are certainly the biggest winners, as Lai defeated his rivals from the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). However, Lai only received 40% of the votes, meaning 60% of the voters did not pick him. In addition, the DPP lost its majority in the Legislative Yuan. This is definitely not a landslide or overwhelming victory for the DPP or Lai.   

Both the KMT and the TPP can claim small victories since the KMT reemerged as the largest party in the legislature by increasing its seats to 52, more than DPP’s 51, and the TPP, as a new party, received eight seats, becoming the third largest party – and so will be wooed by the two larger parties in order to form a majority in the Legislative Yuan. 

Even Washington and Beijing could be viewed as winners in some sense. Washington is believed to favor a party that can stand up to China but does not push too hard in case it triggers a Taiwan Strait crisis. The DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen, the outgoing president, is held as a model by Washington for handling cross-strait relations in a responsible manner and for strengthening US-Taiwan ties. But Washington has doubts about Lai and remains concerned that he may drag the US into a direct conflict with China due to his self-label as a “pragmatic worker of Taiwan independence.” Still, for Washington, the DPP and Lai are preferable, since the KMT in general is perceived to be pro-China, while the TPP’s Ko Wen-je is somewhat unpredictable.   

Beijing can probably take some solace in the fact that 60% Taiwanese voters wanted to unseat the DPP, although the failure of the KMT and the TPP to form a joint ticket gave Lai the opportunity to win. Beijing’s assertion that Lai does not represent the mainstream views in Taiwan has some truth in it.  

The DPP’s hold on power could be for the long haul 

Second, due to Taiwan’s “first past the post” electoral system and a highly divided Taiwanese society, the DPP is likely to stay in power for a long time to come.  DPP candidates can easily defeat challengers simply by appealing to the party’s primary support base which stands at about 40% of eligible voters. On the other hand, the maximum support base for the KMT is below 35% now. Other parties will get even smaller shares. So Taiwanese politics may have entered a period during which the DPP can stay in power even though its performance is lackluster and as many as 60% of the voters do not support it. 

The KMT was never so close to snatching the presidency since Ma Ying-jeou was in power from 2008 to 2016. In the end, Hou only received 33.49% of the votes. The 2024 elections dashed the hope that the KMT may return to power any time soon. 

However, even if the KMT or the TPP had won the presidential election, they would not have pleased Beijing since they support maintaining the cross-strait status quo, not unification with China. All three political parties favor having a robust relationship with the US and strengthening Taiwan’s military preparedness. Beijing’s “one country, two systems” offer is unattractive to these parties. Whoever is in power in Taipei is unlikely to work with Beijing to push for unification. 

Beijing’s Taiwan Dilemma 

Third, Beijing faces a dilemma now: it has to respond and send some kind of warning to the incoming Lai administration. However, if it overacts, its relations with Washington will suffer and cross-strait relations will further deteriorate. That explains why its reactions have been moderate so far.  

Beijing has labelled Lai a separatist, so it is unlikely to talk to him now. However, shunning him will not solve the problem. Beijing will certainly not bend its “one China” principle to talk to Lai, who believes the two sides are not subordinate to each other. Yet without direct communication, the gap between the two sides will continue to grow, and Taiwan will be slipping further away from China.  

But if Beijing decides to punish Lai, this may end up also hurting those 60% of the voters who voted against him, thus creating more anti-China sentiment among the Taiwanese public. Beijing is stuck in a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” situation. 

It is hard to predict what exactly Beijing will do next, but it is clear that Lai's election has posed a serious challenge for the Chinese government. Even before the election, Beijing already hinted it might end the preferential trade and tariff policies under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) reached when Ma was in power. Depending on its calculations, Beijing may resort to a combination of economic, military, and diplomatic measures against Taiwan. 

Finally, US-China cooperation remains the key to peace, stability and prosperity across the Taiwan Strait. Recently, Beijing and Washington have been working together to improve bilateral relations and manage the Taiwan. US officials’ reiteration of Washington’s longstanding “one China” policy, its opposition to unilateral change to the status quo, and President Biden's expression of not supporting Taiwan independence right after the Taiwan election are helpful to stabilizing the Taiwan Strait. Washington prefers no surprises from either Beijing or Taipei. As long as Washington continues to deter Beijing and rein in Taipei, the delicate status quo can be maintained. 

How a Reckless Report from the Council on Foreign Relations Could Increase the Chance of a Crisis with China
By Michael D. Swaine, Jake Werner, and James Park, Responsible Statecraft, June 29, 2023

In article published at Responsible Statecraft, a publication of the Quincy Institute, Michael D. Swaine, Jake Werner, and James Park argue that a recent publication by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) – widely considered the nation’s premier foreign policy think tank – could heighten tensions between the U.S. and China by exaggerating Taiwan’s strategic significance and undervaluing the voices of the Taiwanese themselves. 

The CFR report supposedly drew on the views of a task force composed of a wide range of experts on U.S.-China and U.S.-Taiwan relations. However, the bulk of the study ignores or downplays many of the more balanced stances held by those currently taking part in the Taiwan policy debate. As a result, five of the 17 task force members issued dissents to the report citing foundational problems with the nature of its arguments and recommendations. 

Perhaps the deepest problem with the report, [Swaine, Werner and Park argue], is its depiction of Taiwan as a vital strategic location that must be kept free of Chinese influence in order to preserve U.S. military power in the Asia-Pacific region.  

Repeatedly citing the congressional testimony of a single U.S. defense official (whose remarks have not been subsequently repeated by the Biden administration), the report asserts that Taiwan is vital to the United States due to its “geographic position at the center of the first island chain…its role as the global hub of semiconductor manufacturing… [and] its willingness to work with the United States as a trusted partner on transnational issues.” Taiwan’s fate, the authors argue, “will in large part determine the U.S. military’s ability to operate in the region.” 

Yet the strategic value of Taiwan to the overall U.S. military posture in Asia is a point debated by many analysts and scholars, often without decisive conclusions. While China’s control of Taiwan would doubtless have some considerable constraining effects on U.S. operational ability in Asia, it is highly questionable whether it would have such consequential, determining effects on U.S. regional power projection as the report claims. 

More significantly, by defining Taiwan as an essential U.S. strategic asset, the report repudiates the One China policy, which states that the United States will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) if it is arrived at peacefully and without coercion. 

Its recommendations [the authors conclude], would commit the United States to an open-ended, unlimited, and increasingly intense arms race with China over Taiwan. Such a one-sided approach would deepen the level of Chinese suspicion and distrust over U.S. motives, thereby increasing the likelihood of a severe crisis or conflict with Beijing and placing the people of Taiwan in great danger. 

To read the complete text of this article, click here

Multiple Wargames of Possible Chinese Invasion of Taiwan All Reach the Same Conclusion:
The Invasion Will Likely Fail, But at a Very High Cost to All Parties Involved 

The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan
Report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2023
By Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham 

What would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? Claiming that such an invasion has become increasingly likely, many in Congress and the U.S. military establishment are calling for increased U.S. arms aid to Taiwan and a firm promise of direct U.S. military support should China actually invade. In the process, many assertions have been made about the nature and outcome of such an invasion. But, according to a recent report from the Center for Strategic Studies (CSIS), there is “no rigorous, open-source analysis of the operational dynamics and outcomes of an invasion.” And, without such an analysis, public debate on the topic “will remain unanchored.”  

To help foster informed public discussion of the Taiwan issue, CSIS sought to overcome the lack of rigorous analysis on invasion scenarios by conducting a series of wargames intended to model a possible Chinese amphibious invasion of the island in 2026. Using historical data on past operations of this sort, the game’s organizers sought to make them as realistic as possible. In all, CSIS conducted 24 iterations of the game, providing a reasonably coherent picture of the likely outcome. In almost every case, the outcome is the same: the invasion fails, but all sides take heavy losses. 

According to CSIS, “the invasion always starts the same way: an opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan’s navy and air force in the first hours of hostilities. Augmented by a powerful rocket force, the Chinese navy encircles Taiwan and interdicts any attempts to get ships and aircraft to the besieged island. Tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers cross the strait in a mix of military amphibious craft and civilian roll-on, roll-off ships, while air assault and airborne troops land behind the beachheads. 

“However, in the most likely ‘base scenario,’ the Chinese invasion quickly founders. Despite massive Chinese bombardment, Taiwanese ground forces stream to the beachhead, where the invaders struggle to build up supplies and move inland. Meanwhile U.S. submarines, bombers, and fighter/attack aircraft, often reinforced by Japan Self-Defense Forces, rapidly cripple the Chinese amphibious fleet. China’s strikes on Japanese bases and U.S. surface ships cannot change the result: Taiwan remains autonomous.  

“This defense comes at a high cost. The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of servicemembers. Such losses would damage the U.S. global position for many years. While Taiwan’s military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services. China also suffers heavily. Its navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and tens of thousands of soldiers are prisoners of war.”

To read the complete CSIS report, click here

President Biden Confirms that the U.S. Will Defend Taiwan if Attacked by China, Provoking an Angry Chinese Response  

Analysis by Michael Klare, Sept. 19, 2022 

For all practical purposes, President Biden scuttled the long-term U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding the defense of Taiwan from a hypothetical Chinese invasion by saying “yes” on CBS’s “Sixty Minutes” when asked, “to be clear, sir, U.S. forces—U.S. men and women—would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion?” 

Historically, U.S. policy on this question has been guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, which states that any attempt by a hostile power to alter Taiwan’s political status by force would be considered a matter “of grave concern to the United States,” but not one automatically requiring a U.S. military response.  

This precept, widely described as “strategic ambiguity,” has helped keep the peace for forty years by creating uncertainty in the minds of independence-minded Taiwanese leaders as to whether they would be assured of U.S. support if they were to move in that direction and China invaded, and uncertainty in the minds of Chinese leaders as to whether the U.S. would intervene if they were to invade in such a situation.  

There have been calls among “China hawks” in Congress and the foreign policy community for the abandonment of strategic ambiguity and its replacement with an unambiguous policy of automatic U.S. military intervention, but the White House, until now, has insisted that there has been no change in U.S. policy. Now, with his Sept. 18 comments on Sixty Minutes, Biden seems to have indicated that strategic ambiguity has perished as official policy and that U.S. intervention in the case of a Chinese intervention is all but guaranteed. 

Needless to say, Biden’s comments provoked an angry response from Chinese officials. “China has lodged ‘stern representations’ with the United States following the president’s remarks, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson declared on Sept. 19. Taiwan, said Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, is part of China, and Beijing reserves the right to take all necessary measures in response to activities that split the nation apart. "We are willing to do our best to strive for peaceful reunification. At the same time, we will not tolerate any activities aimed at secession," Mao said. 

Biden’s comments will no doubt be welcomed by those in Taiwan who seek a firm guaranty of U.S. military aid in the event they move towards formal independence and the Chinese take military action to prevent what Mao described as “secession.” But, to be sure, Biden’s remarks will also cause alarm among those in Beijing who fear a Taiwanese move of just this sort, and so could increase the likelihood of a precipitous Chinese military move. And that, if accompanied by U.S. military intervention, could easily result in a regional war of potentially catastrophic—even nuclear—proportions.  

No matter how hard apparatchiks in the White House try to walk back Biden’s comments, it is clear that a watershed has been crossed and that U.S. policy now assumes direct intervention in any China-Taiwan conflict. Given the potentially disastrous outcome of such an encounter, it is essential that U.S. and Chinese officials focus now on conflict avoidance and crisis management measures, lest our worst nightmares come to pass. 

U.S. angers China with potential $1.1 billion arms sale to Taiwan
Patricia Zengerle and Michael Martina, Reuters, Sept. 2, 2022 

[As noted in this article, on Sept. 2 the U.S. State Dept. approved the sale to Taiwan of $1.1 billion in weaponry and military services. The proposed sale—if approved by Congress (as is likely)—will include 60 Harpoon anti-ship missiles (for some $355 million) and 100 AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles (for $86 million). Another $655 million will be used for support of Taiwan's surveillance radar program.] 

President Joe Biden's administration said the package has been under consideration for some time and was developed in consultation with Taiwan and U.S. lawmakers. 

"As the PRC continues to increase pressure on Taiwan – including through heightened military air and maritime presence around Taiwan – and engages in attempts to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, we’re providing Taiwan with what it needs to maintain its self-defense capabilities," Laura Rosenberger, White House senior director for China and Taiwan, said in a statement. 

The Chinese, for their part, condemned the proposed sale. 

Liu Pengyu, spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said in a statement the possible arms sale "severely jeopardizes China-U.S. relations and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait." "China will resolutely take legitimate and necessary counter-measures in light of the development of the situation," he said.

Five big questions about Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit
Zhu Zhiqun, ThinkChina, Aug. 5, 2022 

Note: This article, by Sane Committee Steering Committee member Zhu Zhiqun, was written after the highly controversial visit to Taiwan on August 3, 2022 by U.S. House Speaker Rep. Nancy Pelosi. It originally appeared at the ThinkChina e-magazine and has been shortened for space. To read the full text, click here 

1. Does the U.S. Congress follow its own version of China policy? 

Since the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, the White House and Congress have treated Taiwan differently. While successive administrations have followed the “one China” policy that “acknowledges” the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China, Congress has essentially treated Taiwan as a de facto separate state. Recently, with new legislation upgrading U.S.-Taiwan relations, such as the Taiwan Travel Act, Congress is more assertive with its “one China, one Taiwan” approach. 

Clearly, Pelosi knew that a trip to Taiwan was problematic…. Even after leaving Washington, she kept everyone guessing whether and when she might go to Taiwan. All these show that she understood the sensitivities and risks associated with the trip. Once in Taiwan, Pelosi was not secretive anymore, and her trip had all the trappings of an official visit.  Congress will deny it has a separate China policy, but its practice of treating Taiwan as a de facto independent state creates problems for the China-U.S. relationship. 

2. Why has Beijing responded so vehemently? 

Many note that in 1997, then House speaker Newt Gingrich visited Taipei. So, what is the big deal with Pelosi’s visit 25 years later? There are differences between the two: the previous one happened as China-U.S. relations were moving on an upward trajectory. The current visit occurred at a perilous time in China-U.S. relations when Beijing has diminishing confidence in the U.S.’s commitment to “one China.” Pelosi said that she was in Taiwan to send an “unequivocal message” that “America stands with Taiwan.” At one point during a press conference in Taipei, Pelosi mentioned Taiwan as a “country.” 

Beijing is afraid that the floodgate will be open following Pelosi’s visit, and politicians from the U.S. and elsewhere will visit Taiwan one after another. Pelosi’s visit may signal to politicians around the world that they can show support for Taiwan in person despite opposition from Beijing. 

Pelosi’s visit fits within a recent trend of lawmakers from liberal democracies making more regular visits to Taiwan, especially in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. Beijing fervently opposes the portrayal of the Taiwan issue as a battle between autocracy and democracy. In Beijing’s view, Taiwan is about China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, nothing else. Beijing worries that this “autocracy versus democracy” narrative will shape the global view of Taiwan. 

3. Who is changing the Taiwan Strait status quo? 

Washington, Taipei and Beijing all oppose unilateral change of the status quo, but who has changed or is changing the status quo? 

Washington’s “one China policy” is different from Beijing’s “one China principle.” For Beijing, both the mainland China and Taiwan form “one China,” which is represented by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) internationally. Washington officially recognizes the PRC but does not explicitly accept Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of China. Washington has maintained robust “unofficial relations” with Taiwan since 1979 when it switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. 

For decades, Washington has followed the so-called “strategic ambiguity” regarding cross-Strait disputes, which is a dual deterrence strategy – deterring the PRC from using force against Taiwan and deterring Taiwan from provoking an attack by Beijing [by unilaterally declaring independence]. In recent years, a growing number of analysts and Congress members argue that the U.S. should move from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity,” [entailing an ironclad U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan if it is attacked by China]. 

From Beijing’s perspective, Washington has gradually hollowed out “one China.” Chinese analysts point to factors such as the Taiwan Travel Act, confirmation of U.S. troops in Taiwan, and Biden’s repeated vows to defend Taiwan. Beijing doubts whether Washington still strictly follows its long-standing “one China” policy. 

China, on the other hand, has moved incrementally to take actual control of the Taiwan Strait, such as dispatching warplanes around Taiwan and ignoring the median line in the Taiwan Strait that it tacitly consented to. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s large-scale live-fire military drills around Taiwan following Pelosi’s visit amounted to air and sea blockade of Taiwan. 

4. What does the Pelosi trip mean for China-U.S. relations?  

According to the Chinese ambassador to the U.S. Qin Gang, the Pelosi visit represents an upgrading of “the substantive relations between the U.S. and Taiwan” and “deals a serious blow to the political foundation of China-U.S. relations.”  

Many well-respected China and Taiwan scholars and former government officials such as Michael Swaine, Bonnie Glaser, Shelley Rigger and Chas W. Freeman have warned about the dire consequences of Pelosi’s Taiwan trip. Even the Biden administration felt it necessary to make its concerns known. Many people believe that Pelosi’s Taiwan trip was reckless and unnecessarily provocative and will aggravate tensions between the US and China as well as in cross-Strait relations. 

Both Chinese and U.S. governments face strong domestic challenges. Rising nationalism in China needs to be tamed so that its long-term goal of national rejuvenation and peaceful reunification is not disrupted. Anti-China sentiment in Congress and the media makes it difficult for Washington to stick to the “one China” policy. 

5. What did Taiwan gain from Pelosi’s visit? 

Pelosi’s visit was widely celebrated in Taiwan. Many people in Taiwan appreciated her reaffirmation of U.S. support for Taiwan. Her visit also helped boost Taiwan’s international visibility and gain international sympathy. However, the cost is higher tensions in the Taiwan Strait and further damage to China-U.S. relations. 

Most people believe that Taiwan will be the party feeling the brunt of Beijing’s pressure. In addition to military drills around Taiwan, the scale of which is unprecedented, Beijing also imposed economic sanctions against Taiwan by suspending the import of citrus fruits and seafood products and the export of natural sand, a key component for the production of semiconductor chips. 

Taiwan will become more dependent on the U.S. for its future security and will gradually lose control of its [autonomous] status as the PLA continues to expand its actual control of the Taiwan Strait. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government’s anti-China stance will also harden Beijing’s resolve to be fully prepared for a military solution.  

Taiwan: China attack not imminent, but US watching closely, says Gen Milley
BBC, July 3, 2022 

Note: In this article, the BBC reports on an interview it conducted with Gen. Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the interview, Milley reported that China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), appears to be equipping itself to conduct an invasion of Taiwan if given the order to do so, but has not yet acquired such a capacity – nor is there evidence that the Beijing government is prepared to order such a move anytime soon. 

Asked whether he thought China would attack Taiwan, Gen Milley, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, told the BBC: "Could, should, would, those are key words there.” 

"In terms of capability I think China clearly is developing a capability. President Xi has mentioned that in public forums, he's mentioned it in speeches, that he has challenged the PLA to develop the capability to attack Taiwan at some point in time.” 

"And whether they would or not, it's a political choice, it's a policy choice, that will be based off of how the Chinese view the cost risk benefit at the time." 

"There's no indications or warnings of anything imminent at this time. But again, we watch it very, very closely," Gen Milley added.

China ‘will fight to the very end’ over Taiwan: Chinese defense minister
Colin Clark, Breaking Defense, June 13, 2022 

Note: In this article, Colin Clark of Breaking Defense reports on a talk given by Chinese defense minister Gen. Wei Fenghe at the Shangri-La conference in Singapore on Chinese foreign and military policy. In his address, General Wei castigated the U.S. for attempting to encircle China with a chain of hostile states and reiterated China’s determination to secure reunification with Taiwan. (For an assessment of U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s address at the same event, click here.) 

In his address, Clark indicated, Gen. Wei Fenghe warned that China “will fight to the very end” if “anyone dares to secede” from China, a not-so-veiled shot at Taiwan. “We will fight at all costs. And we will fight to the very end. This is the only choice for China,” Wei said. 

But while laying down that threat, Wei also used a rare public speech to then try and paint China as an innocent player in the region, constantly at threat from an US Indo-Pacific strategy that is “an attempt to build an exclusive small group in the name of a free and open Indo-Pacific.” 

Washington’s goal, he claimed, is to “to target one specific country. It is a strategy to create conflict and confrontation to contain and encircle others. China holds that for any strategy to be valuable it should adapt to the historic and global trends and contribute to regional peace, stability, and the shared interests of all.” 

“Politics, global affairs should be handled through consultation by all stakeholders, instead of being dictated by just one country or small group of countries. No one and no one country should impose its will on others or bully others under the guise of multilateralism,” Wei said.  

General Wei also discussed China’s position on the South China Sea. For a summary of his comments, go to our page devoted to this region, by clicking here.

Biden Appears to Alter U.S. Policy on Taiwan, Suggesting a Readiness to Employ Force if China Evades
Analysis by Michael Klare, May 24, 2022 

Did he or didn’t he? 

On May 23, during a press conference in Tokyo with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, President Biden appeared to alter U.S. policy regarding Taiwan, saying the United States had a “commitment” to defend the island if attacked by China.  

When asked by a reporter if the United States would defend Taiwan if it were attacked, Biden responded, “Yes, That’s the commitment we made.” 

But no such commitment has ever been made. When establishing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic in 1979, the U.S. severed such ties with Taiwan and acknowledged that Taiwan and the mainland were both part of “one China.” Under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, moreover, the U.S. is committed to assist Taiwan with self-defense weaponry as needed, but not to defend the country if attacked. Rather, the Act affirms that Washington would view an attack on Taiwan as a matter “of grave concern to the United States.”  

This stance – known as “strategic ambiguity” – hints at the possibility of U.S. intervention, but does not guaranty it. Critics say it does not provide Taiwan adequate assurance of U.S. protection, but most analysts believe it has helped keep the peace in the region by deterring a precipitous declaration of independence by Taiwan and sowing doubts in Beijing about the U.S. response were it to invade.   

Biden himself seems to have been uncertain about the nature of the U.S. commitment, because he went to say in his response to the question: “We agree with a One China policy. We’ve signed on to it and all the intended agreements made from there. But the idea that, that it (Taiwan) can be taken by force, just taken by force, is just not, is just not appropriate.” 

Back in Washington, senior administration officials rushed to say that there has been no change in U.S. policy towards Taiwan. “As the President said, our policy has not changed,” said a top White House official, who declined to be named. “He reiterated our One China Policy and our commitment to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. He also reiterated our commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide Taiwan with the military means to defend itself.” 

It would be comforting to believe that this is an accurate assessment of Biden’s intent, but we cannot be sure that that is the case. In fact, many in Washington seek to replace “strategic ambiguity” with “strategic clarity” – under which the U.S. would make an ironclad commitment to defend Taiwan if attacked by China – and it appears that Biden has joined that camp. Indeed, his May 23 statement in Tokyo was not the first in which he hinted at his allegiance to this outlook. On Oct. 22, 2021, when asked by Anderson Cooper of CNN whether the United States would defend Taiwan if attacked by China, Biden said, “Yes, we have a commitment to do that.” 

Whether Biden is confused about the nature of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan or merely expressing his personal preference is unclear, but it is very obvious that America’s foreign policy establishment is moving ever closer to the formal abandonment of both the “one China” policy and “strategic ambiguity.”  

But however enthusiastic a response such a move would elicit from anti-China hawks in Washington, it would be sure to provoke further instability in the Taiwan Strait area and increase the risk of armed conflict. Pro-independence forces in Taiwan might view the shift in U.S. policy as the signal to fully separate from the mainland while Chinese leaders, fearing such a move, might choose to resolve the Taiwan issue by force, rather than allow time to work to its advantage. 

Whatever Biden intended, therefore, his remarks are bound to have caused consternation and anger in Beijing, further diminishing prospects for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan dispute.

State Department Modifies Factsheet on U.S.-Taiwan Relations, Provoking Harsh Chinese Reaction

News brief by Joseph Gerson and Michael Klare, May 15, 2022

On May 5, the U.S. Department of State revised its online factsheet on U.S. Relations with Taiwan, omitting language affirming the “One China” principle with its assertion, contained in the 1979 joint communiqué that laid the foundation for direct U.S.-China diplomatic ties, that “the U.S. recognized the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, acknowledging the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China.” 

A line saying that Washington “does not support Taiwan independence,” which appeared in a previous version of the fact sheet, published on August 31, 2018, was also removed from the new text. The May 5 version says the U.S. “continues to encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan.” 

Without explicitly endorsing Taiwanese independence, the new version makes obvious Washington’s preference for a Taiwan linked to the U.S., not the PRC. “As a leading democracy and a technological powerhouse, Taiwan is a key U.S. partner in the Indo-Pacific,” it states. “The United States and Taiwan share similar values, deep commercial and economic links, and strong people-to-people ties, which form the bedrock of our friendship and serve as the impetus for expanding U.S. engagement with Taiwan…. Taiwan has become an important U.S. partner in trade and investment, health, semiconductor and other critical supply chains, investment screening, science and technology, education, and advancing democratic values.” 

Not surprisingly, the Biden administration’s apparent rejection of the One China principle provoked a harsh reaction from Chinese officials. A foreign ministry spokesperson, Zhao Lijian, called the factsheet’s alteration “an act of political manipulation and an attempt to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, which will backfire and the US itself will get burned.” 

China holds military drills around Taiwan as U.S. delegation visits
Reuters, via CNBC, April 15, 2022 

[This article reports on Chinese military exercises conducted in the area near Taiwan during the visit to the island by six U.S. lawmakers, including Sen. Robert Menendez, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Without specifically mentioning the U.S. congressional visit, a spokesperson for China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Shi Yilu, warned against U.S. meddling in cross-Strait affairs.] 

[According to Shi], China’s military sent frigates, bombers and fighter planes to the East China Sea and the area around Taiwan on April 15. “This operation is in response to the recent frequent release of wrong signals by the United States on the Taiwan issue,” Shi said. “The U.S. bad actions and tricks are completely futile and very dangerous. Those who play with fire will burn themselves,” he added. 

[While in Taipei, the U.S. delegation met with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, and spoke of Taiwan’s strategic importance, including as a supplier of semiconductors to the U.S.] 

“With Taiwan producing 90% of the world’s high-end semiconductor products, it is a country of global significance, consequence and impact, and therefore it should be understood the security of Taiwan has a global impact,” Menendez told Tsai in a meeting in the presidential office broadcast live online. 

Republican U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham told Tsai during the delegation’s meeting that the war in Ukraine and provocative behavior by China have united U.S. opinion in a way not seen before. “We will stand with you. To abandon Taiwan will be to abandon democracy and freedom,” he said.

China’s ambassador to US warns of possible military conflict over Taiwan
Vincent Ni, The Guardian, Jan. 28, 2022 

[In this article, Vincent Ni reports on remarks made by China’s ambassador to the U.S., Qin Gang, on National Public Radio on Jan. 28, 2022.] 

“The Taiwan issue is the biggest tinderbox between China and the United States,” Qin Gang told NPR on Jan. 28. “If the Taiwanese authorities, emboldened by the United States, keep going down the road for independence, it most likely will involve China and the United States, the two big countries, in the military conflict.” 

Qin blamed the current state of affairs on the Taiwanese administration. He accused it of “seek[ing] its independence agenda by borrowing the support and the encouragement of the United States.” He added: “And the United States is playing the Taiwan card to contain China.”

Pentagon’s 2022 Budget Seeks China’s Encirclement and Bolstering of U.S.-Taiwanese Military Ties

Analysis by Michael Klare, Comm. for a Sane U.S.-China Policy, Dec. 31, 2021 

On December 27, President Biden signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022, allotting $740 billion to the Department of Defense (DoD) for military procurement and operations over the coming year and setting key policy objectives. As in past years, much of the funding authorized by the NDAA will go towards fuel, ammunition, and the salaries of military personnel, but this year, more than ever before, there is a conspicuous focus on preparing U.S. and allied forces for a possible war with China.  

This focus on China was first underscored in the Department of Defense Budget Request for FY 2022, sent to Congress last May. “China poses the greatest long-term challenge to the United States,” the request states. “Accordingly, DoD will prioritize China and its military modernization as our pacing challenge.” To meet that challenge, and provide for other military essentials, the Pentagon request called for projected expenditures of $715 billion in FY 2022. But even the $715 billion in the administration’s original DoD budget request was not deemed sufficient for a majority of Democrats and Republicans in Congress, who added another $24 billion to the FY 2022 authorization in order to further bolster U.S. forces aimed at China.   

Most of this additional funding will be used to acquire more ships and planes to buttress U.S. forces assigned to the Indo-Pacific region and for programs intended to strengthen military ties with U.S. allies located there…. Some of the additional funds will also be used to invigorate the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), a slew of activities aimed at bolstering U.S. military ties with its allies in the Indo-Pacific region and tighten the military noose surrounding China…. 

Many other provisions of the NDAA, including the PDI, provide the funding for measures aimed at enhancing U.S. ties with traditional allies, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea. But Taiwan represents a special case, in that it is not, formally, a military ally of the United States.

When recognizing the PRC as China’s legitimate government in 1979, the United States agreed to terminate its diplomatic relations and defense ties with Taiwan, and to withdraw all U.S. military forces from the island. At that time, Washington also acknowledged Beijing’s position that “there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.”  

In recent years, and especially during the Trump administration, top officials have questioned the legitimacy of the “one China” policy and stepped up arms sales and diplomatic outreach to Taiwan. Increasingly, the island is being viewed by senior officials not as “part of China” but rather as an autonomous entity whose participation in the U.S.-led alliance system encircling China is deemed essential to American security – a view articulated by Ely Ratner, Assistant Secretary for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in December. “Taiwan,” he asserted, “is located at a critical node within the first island chain [stretching from Japan to the Philippines], anchoring a network of U.S. allies and partners that is critical to the region's security and critical to the defense of vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.” 

This outlook appears to have largely governed the NDAA’s stance on Taiwan. Section 1246, “Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations,” essentially claims that previous restraints on U.S. military ties with Taiwan can now be ignored given the PRC’s “increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior” toward the island. In contrast to the terms of 1982 Arms Trade Communiqué (in which the U.S. pledged to reduce the quantity and quality of its arms transfers to Taiwan), it calls for the sale of increasingly sophisticated weapons to Taiwan. It also calls for joint military exercises between U.S. and Taiwanese forces, increased consultation between senior U.S. and Taiwanese military officials, and enhanced linkages (“interoperability”) between U.S. and Taiwanese maritime surveillance and air-defense systems.   

Following on this, Section 1248 calls on the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study of Taiwan’s vulnerabilities to possible Chinese attack and to identify ways in which the U.S. can assist Taiwan in overcoming those vulnerabilities, including by providing advanced arms-making technology and through the sharing of intelligence data. Yet another measure, Section 1249, calls for a briefing on possible cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwanese National Guards.  

For full text of Klare’s analysis, click here

China warns of "drastic measures" if Taiwan provokes on independence
Reuters, Dec. 29, 2021 

[According to this article, Ma Xiaoguang, spokesman of the Taiwan Affairs Office in Beijing asserted that China would do all it could to achieve the peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, but was prepared to employ extreme measures if Taipei crossed its red lines and moved towards independence.] 

"If separatist forces in Taiwan seeking independence provoke, exert force or even break through any red line, we will have to take drastic measures," Ma said. 

Ma said provocation by pro-independence forces and "external intervention" could grow "sharper and more intense" in coming months. 

"Next year, the Taiwan Strait situation will become more complex and severe," he said.

Breaking the Taiwan Status Quo Will Lead to Crisis
By Zhiqun Zhu, The National Interest, Nov. 7, 2021

[In this article, Sane Committee Steering Comm. Member Zhiqun Zhu describes the “One China” policy vis-à-vis Taiwan and explains how any shift in the U.S. position regarding that policy could encourage Taiwanese leaders to declare independence, triggering Chinese military efforts to prevent such a move and U.S. military intervention. Such a sequence of events, he argues, could have catastrophic consequences for all parties involved.] 

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) has guided America’s unofficial ties with Taiwan since 1979 when Washington established diplomatic relations with Beijing following the “one China” policy. But the TRA is not a defense treaty, and the United States is not obligated to defend Taiwan. President Joe Biden’s claim of rock-solid U.S. commitment to Taiwan created confusion and raised questions about the grave consequences of Washington’s possible change of its long-standing policy toward Taiwan.  

Beijing’s position is that despite the separation of Taiwan and mainland China, which was caused by the Chinese Civil War, China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity remain unchanged. And it is willing to use force to reunify Taiwan into “one China” if peaceful means are unsuccessful. 

U.S. officials have consistently stated that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence and does not follow a policy of “one China, one Taiwan” or “two Chinas.” However, Washington has significantly upgraded its “unofficial” relations with Taiwan in recent years. 

How can the United States support Taiwan’s democracy without encouraging Taiwanese independence, which will drag the United State into war with China? How can the United States protect Taiwan’s people and way of life without turning Taiwan into a chess piece in the U.S.-China power game? Is the United States ditching its decades-old commitment to “one China” at the risk of a military confrontation with China? 

The American people deserve answers to such consequential questions that are not publicly discussed and debated. They must be fully informed of the potential perils in the Taiwan Strait and decide what interests the United States has in the Washington-Beijing-Taipei relationship. Overall, restoring stability in the Taiwan Strait and avoiding war with China over Taiwan should be priorities for the Biden administration’s foreign policy. 

US official signals stunning shift in the way we interpret ‘One China’ policy
Michael D. Swaine, Responsible Statecraft, Dec. 10, 2021 

[In this blog, Michael Swaine of the Quincy Institute reports on important testimony given by Ely Ratner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Dec. 8, 2021. In his testimony, Swaine seemed to suggest that U.S. strategists now view Taiwan as a vital lynchpin in the U.S.-devised defense perimeter surrounding China, stretching from Japan and South Korea in the north to the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, and Singapore to the west and south. This is very different, he suggests, from the view held by earlier administrations of Taiwan as an essentially neutral entity in this space.] 

On Dec. 8, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner made an unprecedented public statement by a serving senior U.S. official. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, he stated that the island of Taiwan is strategically “critical to the region’s security and critical to the defense of vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.”

Ratner defined Taiwan’s strategic importance as deriving from the notions that it is: a “critical node within the first island chain,” “integral to the regional and global economy,” and a “beacon of democratic values” in contrast with the People’s Republic of China. In other words, he defined the island as a strategic location of value to the U.S. precisely because it is militarily, economically, and politically distinct from China. 

This statement is hugely reckless, because it clearly implies that, in fact, Taiwan should be regarded primarily as a strategic asset to be kept separate from Beijing. That clear implication amounts to a direct abandonment of the U.S. One China policy and the understanding reached with Beijing at the time of normalization. That understanding included a U.S. acknowledgement of Beijing’s position that Taiwan is a part of China, and Beijing’s indication that it would pursue peaceful unification as a top priority. That is the primary basis for continued peace in the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan's President says the threat from China is increasing 'every day' and confirms presence of US military trainers on the island
By Will Ripley, Eric Cheung and Ben Westcott, CNN, October 28, 2021

[In this article, the authors describe an exclusive CNN interview with President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan. In the interview, Tsai said that Taiwan is a "beacon" of democracy that needed to be defended to uphold faith worldwide in democratic values. She also, for the first time, confirmed the presence of American troops on Taiwanese soil.] 

In her interview with CNN, Tsai became the first Taiwan President in decades to acknowledge the presence of US troops on the island for training purposes. The last official US garrison left in 1979, the year Washington switched formal diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, though last year media reports hinted at small deployments. 

The US military posted and then deleted a video in early 2020 that showed US Army Special Forces training soldiers in Taiwan. In November 2020, Taiwan's Defense Ministry announced and then denied to local media that US troops were training local soldiers on the island. 

Tsai wouldn't say exactly how many US military personnel are on the island at present but said it was "not as many as people thought." "We have a wide range of cooperation with the US aiming at increasing our defense capability," she said.

Dangerous Brinkmanship Over Taiwan:
How to avoid US-Chinese military conflict in the Western Pacific

By Michael T. Klare, TheNation.com, Oct. 27, 2021

[In this article, Committee Co-Founder Michael Klare expounds on assessments he has published on the the Committee’s website concerning the risk of conflict - intentional or unintentional - between the U.S. and China over Taiwan.]

In recent weeks, the airwaves have been full of inflammatory rhetoric over Taiwan, increasing the risk that tensions over the island’s status could provide the spark for a military conflict, even a catastrophic war, between the United States and China. On October 10, President Xi Jinping of China called on the Taiwanese to merge with the mainland in a peaceful fashion, but warned of unspecified dangers if they chose otherwise. “Those who forget their ancestors, betray the motherland, or split the country are doomed,” he said of Taiwanese “separatists.” A day later, President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan avowed that her country must “resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty,” and would negotiate with Beijing only “on the basis of parity”—a stance wholly unacceptable to the Chinese leadership.

On this side of the Pacific, politicians from both parties were quick to condemn Xi’s foreboding threats and to offer support for Tsai’s uncompromising posture. Many Republicans demanded an ironclad US commitment to defend Taiwan in the event it was attacked by China, and President Biden, when asked by Anderson Cooper of CNN whether the United States would defend Taiwan under those circumstances, said, “Yes, we have a commitment to do that.”

This talk of formalizing a US defense commitment to Taiwan is generating increasingly hostile and threatening comments from Chinese officials, who consistently describe Taiwan as a renegade province and warn against any foreign involvement in resolving its status. “The Taiwan issue is entirely China’s internal affair, and no external interference can be condoned,” Xi stated in his October 11 address. Taiwan is part of China, he insisted, and “no one should underestimate the Chinese people’s determination, and strong ability to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” he added. Global Times, widely considered a mouthpiece for ultra-nationalistic forces within the Chinese leadership, was more specific, saying that China’s military “has an overwhelming advantage over the military on Taiwan island, with full capacity to cause unbearable results to US troops if they dare ‘defend’ the island, and even to wipe them out.”

Consider this: Between October 1 and 4, China’s air force repeatedly sent waves of its combat planes into Taiwan’s air-defense identification zone (ADIZ), its outer defense perimeter. All told, some 150 aircraft participated in these actions, including advanced J-16 stealth fighters and nuclear-capable H-6 bombers. The unprecedented Chinese air incursions raised tensions in the region and sparked angry denunciations from US officials. The Biden administration was “very concerned” by China’s “provocative military activity near Taiwan,” State Department spokesperson Ned Price said on October 2, adding that “[it is] destabilizing, risks miscalculations, and undermines regional peace and stability.” The talk was even more ferocious on Capitol Hill, where many lawmakers called for immediate action to bolster Taiwan’s defenses.

What none of these irate officials mentioned is that the US Navy was conducting its own military maneuvers at that time, and in the same general area. Participating in that exercise, held over the October 2–3 weekend in waters southeast of Okinawa, were three aircraft carriers (two American and one British) with a combined air complement of 200 warplanes—far more than the number deployed by China in neighboring airspace during that same time period. Also unmentioned in Washington is the fact that the United States regularly sends its combat ships through the Taiwan Strait—a body of water claimed by Beijing as lying within its territorial waters—with the most recent such missions occurring on September 17 and October 14.

These activities may have a primarily political intent—to demonstrate the capacity and will to carry out the respective party’s major objectives—but they possess an inherent risk of unintended or accidental escalation with potentially devastating consequences.

To read the full article, click here

Beijing accuses Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen of demanding equal ‘state-to-state’ treatment
Rachel Zhang, Oct. 13, 2021 

[In this article, Zhang reports on China’s response to Taiwanese President Tsai’s Oct. 10 address calling for talks between Taipei and Beijing “on the basis of parity.” (See entry for Oct. 10, 2021.)] 

On Oct. 12, Ma Xiaoguang, a spokesman for the mainland Taiwan Affairs Office said when asked about Tsai’s comments: “Both sides across the Taiwan Strait belong to one China and their relations are by no means ‘state-to-state.’” 

“Since 1949, although the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have not been completely reunified, the fact that the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China has never changed and cannot be changed,” Ma said. “We will never tolerate any act of Taiwan independence and will never allow Taiwan to split from China,” he said, adding that no one should underestimate China’s determination and ability to defend its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.  

Tsai Ing-wen says Taiwan must ‘resist annexation’
Lawrence Chung, South China Morning Post, Oct. 10, 2021 

[In this article, Chung reports on a speech given by Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen on Taiwan’s National Day, ten days after Chinese President Xi Jinping, in a speech marking the 110th anniversary of the founding of the first Republic of China, called for the peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland but warned of perilous consequences if the Taiwanese failed to do so (see entry for Oct. 9, 2021).] 

In a speech to mark the 110th anniversary of the foundation of the Republic of China (ROC) – which Taiwan’s government uses as an official title – Tsai said Taiwan must “resist annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty,” and stressed that “the future of the ROC must be decided in accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people.”  

Tsai said she was open to discussions with the mainland over Taiwan’s status, but said: “Resolving cross-strait differences requires the two sides of the strait to engage in dialogue on the basis of parity” – a stance wholly unacceptable to Chinese leaders, who view Taiwan as a renegade province of China and not as a sovereign state with equal status as the People’s Republic. (See entry for Oct. 13, 2021.)  

Chinese President Xi Jinping says peaceful reunification with Taiwan is in country’s best interests
William Zheng, South China Morning Post, Oct. 9, 2021,

[In this article, Zheng reports on a speech given by Chinese President Xi Zinping on the 110th anniversary of the Chinese Republic. In his remarks, Xi outlined Beijing’s stance on Taiwan, calling for the peaceful reunification of the island with the mainland but warning of dire consequences if the Taiwanese choose otherwise.] 

“To achieve the reunification of the motherland by peaceful means is most in line with the overall interests of the Chinese nation, including our compatriots in Taiwan,” Xi told a meeting in Beijing commemorating the 110th anniversary of the 1911 revolution that established the first Chinese republic. 

He urged Taiwan to “stand on the right side of history jointly to create the glorious cause of the full reunification and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” 

Xi added that secessionists were “the biggest obstacle to the reunification of the motherland and a serious hidden risk to national rejuvenation.”  

“Those who forget their ancestors, betray the motherland, or split the country are doomed. They will definitely be spurned by the people and judged by history.”

Serious consequences if Washington allows renaming of Taiwan’s US office
Zhiqun Zhu, Think China, Sept. 14, 2021

[NOTE: The Biden administration is reportedly considering a request from the Taiwanese government to change the name of its mission in Washington from the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office”(TECRO) to the “Taiwan Representative Office.” In this article, Zhiqun Zhu, a Steering Committee member of the Committee for a Sane U.S.-China Policy, analyzes the potential repercussions of such a step.]  

That the Taiwanese people want to raise Taiwan’s international profile is worth respecting. However, changing names has to do with cross-strait relations as well as US-China relations and cannot be done recklessly. The current TECRO with Taipei in its name is a compromise by the US to uphold the one-China policy in not recognizing Taiwan as an independent country. While the Kuomintang (KMT) was in office, Taiwan was not satisfied with the name but still found it acceptable. 

Of course, Taiwan’s current Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government is extremely unhappy, and has been pushing to change the name of Taiwan’s representative office in the US. The intentions of the DPP government are not to raise Taiwan’s international profile, but rather to try and highlight that Taiwan is a country independent from China. The DPP government hopes the US government will rename TECRO to the official-sounding Taiwan Representative Office. 

As the DPP strives towards its Taiwan independence goal, it would naturally do everything possible to persuade the US to change its one-China policy. If the US really agrees to TECRO’s name change to Taiwan Representative Office, that would be publicly elevating US-Taiwan relations and a direct challenge to China’s red line of the one-China policy. It can be expected that Beijing will be forced to put up a fierce retaliation against the US and Taiwan. 

If so, Biden and Xi’s Sept. 9 telephone diplomacy to improve US-China relations would be in vain and US-China relations would take a sharp turn for the worse. It would be even more difficult for both countries to cooperate, and a military crisis could also break out in the Taiwan Strait. Seen in this light, changing the name of Taiwan’s office in the US is not a trivial matter but a weighty issue with serious consequences which will test the wisdom and judgement of all parties.

Opinion: New arms sales send the wrong signal on Taiwan
By A. Trevor Thrall , Jordan B. Cohen , and Michael Klare, Defense News, Aug. 17, 2021 

NOTE: In this opinion article, the three authors – including Committee Co-Founder Michael Klare – argue that the Biden administration’s decision to sell $750 worth of advanced arms to Taiwan at this time will do little to enhance Taiwan’s ability to defend itself unilaterally against a hypothetical Chinese invasion but will further tether the island to the U.S., increasing Chinese resentment and exposing Taiwan to even greater risk. 

The Biden administration recently approved its first arms sale to Taiwan for $750 million worth of howitzers and high-tech munitions kits. Proponents incorrectly argue that this sale will enhance stability in the region by sending a strong signal to China of America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security and by complicating any Chinese plans for an invasion of the island. In fact, the sale will accomplish nothing of the sort. To avoid enflaming tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. needs to halt sales of weapons to Taiwan. 

This sale will not allow Taiwan to better defend itself in any clash with China. It will, however, tell Taiwan that it’s OK to keep passing the buck to the United States for its defense. Moreover, a new sale of arms at this time is sure to inflame tensions between Beijing and Washington, increasing the risk of conflict and making it more difficult to make progress on issues of mutual concern, such as climate change, trade and nuclear nonproliferation.

Biden administration approves first arms sale to Taiwan
Rebecca Kheel, The Hill, Aug. 4, 2021 

NOTE: In this article, Rebecca Kheel of The Hill reports that the Biden administration has approved its first major arms sale to Taiwan, a deal said to be worth $750 million. The proposed sale will now be submitted to Congress, which has 30 days to reject the sale – an unlikely outcome, given strong bipartisan support for Taiwan – after which it will go ahead. The sale is bound to provoke resentment in Beijing, and further strain U.S.-China relations. 

The State Department has approved selling Taiwan up to 40 BAE Systems-made M109 self-propelled howitzers and related equipment, including up to 1,698 kits to turn projectiles into precision-guided munitions, in a deal estimated to be worth $750 million, according to a notice released Wednesday. 

“This proposed sale serves U.S. national, economic and security interests by supporting the recipient’s continuing efforts to modernize its armed forces and to maintain a credible defensive capability,” the notice said. “The proposed sale will help improve the security of the recipient and assist in maintaining political stability, military balance, economic and progress in the region.” 

The notice kicks off a 30-day congressional review period in which lawmakers could move to block the sale if they want…. China, meanwhile, has frequently lashed out whenever the United States approves more arms for Taiwan, which it sees as a breakaway province.

US does not support Taiwan independence: Kurt Campbell
Ken Moriyasu, Nikkei Asia, July 7, 2021

NOTE: In this article, Ken Moriyasu of Nikkei Asia reports on remarks on Taiwan made by Kurt Campbell, President Biden’s coordinator for Asia-Pacific policy, following an interview at the Asia Society on July 6, 2021. Campbell’s remarks at the Asia Society represented his first public comments since Chinese President Xi Jinping’s July 1 speech celebrating the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, in which the Chinese leader called the reunification of China and Taiwan “a historic mission and an unshakable commitment” of the party. 

"We support a strong unofficial relationship with Taiwan. We do not support Taiwan independence," Campbell said in response to a question from the moderator, "how much love is too much?" when it comes to stronger relations with the island. 

"We fully recognize and understand the sensitivities involved here," he said. "We do believe that Taiwan has a right to live in peace. We want to see its international role, particularly in areas like vaccines and issues associated with the pandemic, they should have a role to play here, they should not be shunned in the international community."

Biden Administration Contemplates Permanent Naval Force in Taiwan Area to Deter China, Intervene in the Case of a China-Taiwan Conflict

Analysis by Michael Klare, Sane Committee Co-Founder, June 22, 2021 

It appears that the Biden administration is nearing a decision to deploy a permanent naval squadron in waters near Taiwan, both to deter China from invading the island should the Taiwanese declare independence – a move Chinese authorities have warned could lead to war – and to fight the Chinese military should such a clash occur.  

Such an initiative seems to have emerged from the Pentagon’s China Task Force, established by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin soon after assuming his position to develop strategic guidance for countering China.  

By creating such a force, the administration would essentially be abandoning the policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding potential U.S. intervention in a China-Taiwan clash – a policy that has kept the peace in the region for over 40 years. Under this approach, first articulated in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, any attempt by China to seize Taiwan by military means will be considered a matter “of grave concern to the United States,” but not one automatically requiring a U.S. military response. This ambiguous approach has simultaneously deterred China from invading Taiwan, as it cannot be sure the U.S. will not intervene in such a scenario, but has also deterred the Taiwanese from declaring independence, as they cannot be sure the U.S. will intervene.  

By permanently deploying a naval force near Taiwan, however, the U.S. will be offering encouragement to the Taiwanese that they can declare independence with high assurance of U.S. intervention. Should this then precipitate such a move by Taipei, Chinese leaders – who insist that Taiwan is part of sovereign Chinese territory – may feel compelled to invade, leading to U.S. intervention and a U.S.-China war that could well escalate to a nuclear conflict. 

The following two articles reveal administration thinking on plans for the permanent naval squadron.

* * *

U.S. Needs ‘Combat-Credible’ Forces to Deter China, Nominee Says
Peter Martin, Bloomberg, June 16, 2021

[NOTE: In written answers to questions for his confirmation hearing on June 16, Ely Ratner, President Joe Biden’s nominee to be assistant secretary of defense for the Indo-Pacific region, told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that the U.S. military should maintain a “combat-credible” posture in the Indo-Pacific to help deter potential Chinese aggression, especially towards Taiwan.

Such an approach would include the “forward” positioning of U.S. forces in order to “deter, and, if necessary, deny a fait accompli scenario” where China tries to quickly overwhelm Taiwan, Ratner told the Senate Armed Services Committee…. The strategy would also include “new operational concepts, modernized and high-end ready forces, and capable allies and partners proficient in their warfighting roles,” he said.

[The People’s Liberation Army is] “well-resourced, and rapidly developing both in terms of direct military pressure on Taiwan and through other PLA capabilities aimed at deterring, delaying or denying third-party intervention in a crisis,” he said. If confirmed, Ratner said, he will “carefully review the current military balance across the Taiwan Strait to ensure that our defense cooperation with Taiwan is commensurate with the threat posed” by China.

* * *

Pentagon considering permanent naval task force to counter China in the Pacific
Lara Seligman, Politico, June 15, 2021

NOTE: According to this article, the Department of Defense is considering the establishment of a permanent naval task force in the Pacific region as a counter to China’s growing naval might. According to people familiar with internal discussions, the plan would also involve creating a named military operation for the Pacific that would enable the defense secretary to allocate additional dollars and resources to countering China problem, said the people, who requested anonymity to discuss pre-decisional plans.

The two initiatives, which are not yet finalized…grew out of work by the Pentagon’s China Task Force, which Biden commissioned in March to examine the department’s China-related policies and processes. The group, led by Ely Ratner, the nominee to serve as the Pentagon’s top Indo-Pacific policy official, recently completed its work and presented recommendations to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. 

The [proposed] naval task force would be modeled on a construct NATO launched in Europe leading up to and during the Cold War, the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic, the people familiar with the discussions told POLITICO. The squadron was an immediate reaction force that could rapidly respond to a crisis but spent most of its time steaming around the region, participating in scheduled exercises and making goodwill port calls.

Low probability of China trying to seize Taiwan in near term -Top U.S. general
Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart, Reuters, June 17, 2021

NOTE: In this article, Reuters reported that General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told members of the Senate Appropriations Committee on June 17, 2021 that China was not prepared to invade Taiwan and was not inclined to do so at this time.  

The top U.S. general said on June 17 there was a low probability that China would try to take over Taiwan militarily in the near-term as Beijing has some way to go to develop the capabilities needed. 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley told lawmakers that while Taiwan was still a core national interest of China, "There's little intent right now, or motivation, to do it militarily." 

"There's no reason to do it militarily, and they know that. So, I think the probability is probably low, in the immediate, near-term future," Milley said during a Congressional hearing. "My assessment in terms of capability, I think China has a ways to go to develop the actual, no-kidding capability to conduct military operations to seize through military means the entire island of Taiwan, if they wanted to do that," he added.  

Biden’s Asia nominee says U.S. should develop Taiwan ties in every sector
Reuters, via Asahi Shimbun, June 16, 2021 

NOTE: In this article, Reuters reports on the confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of Daniel Kritenbrink to be the top U.S. diplomat for East Asia. Kritenbrink is a career foreign service officer who was most recently ambassador to Vietnam and a former deputy head of mission in China. 

Kritenbrink said it was important for Washington to demonstrate its resolve to meet its “rock-solid obligations” toward Taiwan in the face of pressure from China, which claims the self-governing island as its own territory. 

“It’s... incumbent upon us to further develop our robust relationship with Taiwan in every sector,” Kritenbrink told a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on his nomination to be assistant secretary of state for East Asia. 

Kritenbrink described China as the “major challenge the United States faces today” and said new guidelines adopted by the Biden administration for Taiwan relations were “significantly liberalized” and “explicitly designed to further develop our relationships and our partnership.”

When and Why China Might – or Might Not – Attack Taiwan
Jacob Stokes, DefenseOne, May 11, 2021

In this article, Stokes, a Fellow at the Center for a New America, reviews various U.S. theories about when China might invade Taiwan to secure its reunification with the mainland. Many of these theories derive from Chinese President Xi Jinping’s oft-repeated intent to pave the way for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by the centennial anniversary of the founding the People’s Republic of China in 2049. Other experts, he writes, expect an invasion sooner: by 2035, when state-run media say the People’s Liberation Army, will “basically” be modernized enough to fight and win a regional war against another advanced military. Stokes continues… 

Alternative structural assessments see a more imminent peril. They argue the world, especially the United States, is entering a dangerous decade in relations with China generally and with regard to Taiwan specifically, where Beijing’s relative power is reaching an apex compared to would-be geopolitical competitors. Those theories posit that Chinese leaders might conclude they must attempt to forcibly annex Taiwan while they are at their strongest or risk it falling out of their grasp forever…. 

Another category of theories about when China might send mount a full-spectrum invasion might be described as events-driven. Beijing has clearly stated that any declaration of independence or clear moves in that direction by the government in Taipei would provoke an attack.  

Stokes also suggests that China may decide to not invade Taiwan at all: 

Beijing no doubt understands that, despite the temptations, any decision to use military force against Taiwan would entail world-historical levels of risk. The PLA enjoys hefty budgets and increasingly cutting-edge capabilities. But it has not fought a war since 1979 and could still flunk its first test in decades for any numbers of reasons. Non-material factors like the capacity for effective combat leadership are notoriously difficult to develop and measure. 

A failed invasion or even one with a messy mixed outcome could pose a major threat to the CCP regime. Politically, many Chinese citizens would question the leadership’s judgment and competence. Economically, even a successful campaign would require starting a major war right at the epicenter of lucrative-but-fragile global supply chains. Xi might believe he is on the cusp of fulfilling one of the Party’s most sacred goals by moving to take Taiwan – only to blow up the economic growth and stability pillars that are foundational to CCP rule in China. And that is not even mentioning the risk of uncontrolled military escalation. 

When it comes to shaping U.S. policy, Stokes urges Washington to regularly remind Beijing of the risks of attacking Taiwan but to avoid announcing any shift in policy that might cause the Chinese to adopt a more bellicose stance: 

Washington should continue to emphasize to Beijing the costs of aggression and the value of the status quo for China, the region, and the world…. At the same time, however, U.S. policymakers should avoid official, public policy changes—including ending the policy of “strategic ambiguity”—that would be construed as Washington revising the status quo and therefore be likely spark a crisis.

The Problem with “Clarity”
Analysis by Michael Klare, Sane Committee Co-Founder, May 9, 2021 

Since the onset of the Biden administration China hawks in Congress and the Washington think-tank universe have been calling for “strategic clarity” on America’s pledge to defend Taiwan in the event it is attacked by China. Under the current policy of “strategic ambiguity” on the issue, U.S. leaders have consistently stated that they oppose China’s use of force to alter Taiwan’s status, but have never explicitly promised to intervene in such a case.  

This stance is derived from the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, which states that it is the policy of the United States “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means…a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Critics claim that this dictum is too vague and might lead Chinese leaders to conclude they could invade Taiwan without eliciting a U.S. military response. These critics call for the adoption of an ironclad vow by the U.S. to respond militarily to any such Chinese move, thus replacing “ambiguity” with “clarity.” 

“The United States needs to be clear that we will not allow China to invade Taiwan and subjugate it,” Sen. Tom Cotton (R.-Ark) declared in a Feb. 2021 address at the Ronald Reagan Institute. “I think the time has come to be clear: Replace strategic ambiguity with strategic clarity that the United States will come to the aid of Taiwan if China was to forcefully invade Taiwan or otherwise change the status quo across the [Taiwan] Strait,” he added. 

But this argument has come under criticism who argue that “strategic ambiguity” has served U.S. interests well, by perpetuating the notion – long endorsed by top U.S. officials – that there is but “One China” and that Taiwan is part of that common nation, even if its relationship to the mainland is yet to be resolved. Under this arrangement, Taiwan has been able to pursue its own political path yet has refrained from declaring full independence, not knowing of America’s intentions under such circumstances. Should the U.S. vow to defend Taiwan from China under any circumstances, it could be emboldened to declare independence – a move that would almost certainly provoke a Chinese military invasion and, if the U.S. were to carry out its vow to aid Taiwan, the onset of a full-scale U.S.-Chinese conflict, possibly resulting in the use of nuclear weapons.  

This argument was cogently argued by Peter Beinart, professor of journalism and political science at The Newmark School of Journalism at the City University of New York, in an op-ed in the New York Times, “Biden’s Taiwan Policy Is Reckless,” on May 6, 2021.  “When it comes to defending Taiwan from a Chinese attack, Washington’s official policy is ‘strategic ambiguity’: The United States won’t say how it would respond,” Beinart wrote. “Nonetheless, the Biden administration has said that America’s support for Taiwan is ‘rock solid,’ and calls for a more formal commitment to the island’s defense are growing. But whether or not the United States officially pledges to come to Taiwan’s defense, it is deeply reckless to believe that it can both provoke Beijing by undoing the “One China” compact and deter it with the threat of military force. This is so, he explained, because Taiwan matters more to the Chinese, who consider it an inalienable part of their national territory, than Americans, who possess a far lesser stake in the outcome of a (potentially nuclear) war over the island.  

The risks inherent in abandoning strategic ambiguity for a more explicit pledge to defense Taiwan were further articulated by Kurt Campbell, the top Asia policy coordinator in the National Security Council, during a May 4 “Global Boardroom” conference conducted by the Financial Times.  

“There are some significant downsides to . . . strategic clarity,” Campbell told the Global Boardroom conference. “The best way to maintain peace and stability is to send a really consolidated message that involves diplomacy, defence innovation and our own capabilities to the Chinese leadership, so they don’t contemplate some sort of ambitious, dangerous provocative set of steps in the future,” he said. Asked whether the world should be preparing for possible conflict over Taiwan, Campbell played down the risk, saying the Chinese military activity was an effort to “turn the screws” on Taiwan.

Biden’s Director of National Intelligence Testifies: China would find change in US policy toward Taiwan 'deeply destabilizing'
Rebecca Kheel, The Hill, April 29, 2021

In this article, the author reports on testimony by Avril Haines, the Director of National Intelligence, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. policy regarding the defense of Taiwan. Under existing U.S. policy, known as “Strategic Ambiguity,” the U.S. has not stated explicitly that will come to Taiwan’s defense if it is invaded by Taiwan, but leaves that option open. Recently, various figures, including Sen. Tom Cotton (R.-Ark.), have called for replacing Strategic Ambiguity with “strategic clarity” or a more explicit pledge to defend Taiwan in such a situation. Haines’ testimony speaks to this point. 

“From our perspective, if we were to see a U.S. shift from strategic ambiguity, as you’ve identified it, to clarity over a willingness to intervene in a Taiwan contingency, the Chinese would find this deeply destabilizing,” Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told the Senate Armed Services Committee. 

“I think it would solidify Chinese perceptions that the U.S. is bent on constraining China's rise, including through military force, and would probably cause Beijing to aggressively undermine U.S. interests worldwide,” she added. 

From Taipei's perspective, Haines said, it’s “possible” a U.S. change from "strategic ambiguity" could lead to more Taiwanese movement toward independence. “I would say that already Taiwan is hardening to some extent towards independence as they're watching, essentially, what happened in Hong Kong, and I think that is an increasing challenge,” she added.

Tensions Mount Over Taiwan

Analysis by Michael Klare, Co-Founder, Committee for a Sane U.S.-China Policy 

Over the past few weeks, tensions over Taiwan involving the U.S., China, and the Taiwanese government have increased significantly. This appears to be the result of the Biden administration’s signaling of closer ties to Taipei on one hand and China’s determination to deter the Taiwanese from making any move toward greater independence on the other. Indeed, these moves tend to feed on one another: China responds to any U.S. expression of support for Taipei by increasing its military pressure on Taiwan, and Washington responds to Chinese moves by signaling greater support and deploying more U.S. forces in the region. 

Biden Administration announces new guidelines on ties with Taiwan: On April 9, the U.S. Department of State revealed that it had issued “new guidelines for U.S. government interaction with Taiwan counterparts to encourage U.S. government engagement with Taiwan that reflects our deepening unofficial relationship.” Without providing specifics, the announcement stated that “These new guidelines liberalize guidance on contacts with Taiwan.” Presumably, this means some variant of the measures announced by former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on January 9, 2021 terminating restrictions on U.S. government contacts with Taiwan officials.  

Biden sends “unofficial” delegation to Taiwan: On April 13, 2021, the Biden administration dispatched an “unofficial” delegation of former top officials to Taipei for conversations with senior Taiwanese officials in what a White House official called a “personal signal” of the president’s commitment to the Chinese-claimed island. The delegation consisted of Former U.S. Senator Chris Dodd and former deputy secretaries of state Richard Armitage and James Steinberg. “The selection of these three individuals – senior statesmen who are long-time friends of Taiwan and personally close with President Biden – sends an important signal about the U.S. commitment to Taiwan and its democracy,” the White House official stated.

China warns U.S. to stop ‘playing with fire’ on Taiwan: Chinese officials on April 13, 2021 warned the Biden administration to stop “playing with fire” when it comes to U.S. relations with Taiwan, following new State Department guidelines that seek to deepen ties with Taipei. “There is zero room for compromise and not an inch to give,” Chinese spokesperson Zhao Lijian told reporters. “We urge the U.S. side to grasp the situation…refrain from playing with fire, immediately stop official contact with Taiwan in any form.” The spokesman warned against sending the “wrong signals to Taiwan ‘independence forces’ so as not to subversively influence and damage Sino-U.S. relations and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”

Increased U.S., Chinese military maneuvers: As part of this process, both sides have increased their aggressive and provocative air and naval maneuvers in the area surrounding Taiwan, a phenomenon monitored by the Committee on its “Provocative Actions” page. On April 7, the U.S. Navy conducted its fourth “freedom of navigation operation” (FONOP) in the Taiwan Strait separating the mainland from Taiwan – a tempo previously recorded only during the last months of the Trump administration – while China conducted its largest ever deployment of warplanes into the airspace claimed by Taiwan on April 12.

Blinken warns it would be a 'serious mistake' for Taiwan's status to be changed 'by force'
Joseph Choi, CNN, April 11, 2021

While appearing on NBC’s “Meet the Press” on April 11, host Chuck Todd asked Secretary of State Antony Blinken if the U.S. was prepared to defend Taiwan militarily.  

Blinken responded, “So, Chuck, what we've seen and what is a real concern to us is increasingly aggressive actions by the government in Beijing, directed at Taiwan, raising tensions in the straits. And we have a commitment to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act, a bipartisan commitment that's existed for many many years to make sure that Taiwan has the ability to defend itself and to make sure that we're sustaining peace and security in the western Pacific.”  

Blinken added, “We stand behind all those commitments and all I can tell you is, it would be a serious mistake for anyone to try to change the existing status quo by force.” 

Todd pressed Blinken on whether the U.S. government’s “commitments” included military action. Blinken responded that he would not be discussing "hypotheticals" and instead stated the U.S. would stand by its commitment to allow Taiwan to defend itself. “We have a serious commitment to peace and security in the western Pacific and in that context, it would be a serious mistake for anyone to try to change that status quo by force,” he said.

Give Taiwan ‘consistent’ arms sales, says US regional commander
Aaron Mehta, DefenseNews, March 5, 2021

In this article, Aaron Mehta reports on comments made by Adm. Philip Davidson, commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, at an event hosted by the American Enterprise Institute. 

“Helping to encourage Taiwan on their investments, a mix of capabilities that include capabilities that helps Taiwan deter as well as provides some decent [other] capabilities that helps Taiwan defend, I think is a very important approach that the [Defense] Department needs to take,” Adm. Davidson said. 

“And I would say, you know, for the greater U.S. government – consistent arms sales to Taiwan to help in this deterrence strategy is critically important. And again, that takes a balance to capabilities to go to them,” he added.

Pacific Commander Warns China Likely to Move on Taiwan
Paul McLeary, Breaking Defense, March 9, 2020

In this article, Paul McLeary reports on testimony by Adm. Philip Davidson, commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 8, 2021 regarding the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region. In his testimony, he warned that China was preparing for an invasion of Taiwan in the not-too-distant future. 

China’s leaders, he said, are “accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States and our leadership role in the rules-based international order,” which they’ve long said that they want to do by 2050. “I’m worried about them moving that target closer. Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before that, and I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in the next six years.” 

One way to support Taiwan is through “persistent arms sales,” which were accelerated by the Trump administration, and could continue under the Biden team given its public comments on the need to contend with the Chinese buildup and incendiary rhetoric when it comes to the independent island.

White House: U.S. Stance on Taiwan Remains the Same 
Steve Herman, VOA, March 8, 2021

In this article, Steve Herman of the VOA reports that the White House brushed off Chinese demands that it roll back the more Taiwan-friendly policies adopted by the Trump administration. 

China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, says Washington needs to roll back what he termed the Trump administration’s “dangerous practice” of showing support for Taiwan – adding Beijing has “no room for compromise.” 

White House Press Secretary Jan Psaki, asked by VOA about the top diplomat’s warning, said the United States will maintain its long-standing commitments to Taipei. “And we will continue to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability. So, our position remains the same," Psaki said. 

Biden has said he seeks a more civil relationship with China, but he has not rescinded Trump’s tough moves regarding technology, trade and human rights.

A blueprint for World War III…

Cotton: Give China ‘crystal clear’ warning not to invade Taiwan
Joe Gould, Defense News, Feb. 18, 2021 

According to this report, Senator Tom Cotton (Rep.-Ark.), a senior Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, declared in an address at the Ronald Reagan Institute that the U.S. should end its “strategic ambiguity” with regard to the defense of Taiwan (whereby it has hinted it would defend the island if attacked by China, but never said so outright) and make clear it was prepared to do so. 

“The United States needs to be clear that we will not allow China to invade Taiwan and subjugate it. Case closed. No further debate,” Cotton was quoted as saying. 

“I think the time has come to be clear: Replace strategic ambiguity with strategic clarity that the United States will come to the aid of Taiwan if China was to forcefully invade Taiwan or otherwise change the status quo across the [Taiwan] Strait,” he added. 

Cotton went further, envisioning a clear recipe for World War III, saying the U.S. should be prepared to aid Japan if China attacked any of the disputed islands in the East China Sea or invaded India. 

The U.S. should establish further “clear red lines that will require a response by the United States,” such as if China seizes any of the islands claimed by Taiwan or Japan, invades regional allies like India or permits an attack on American troops or allies by North Korea, he stated. 

Cotton’s comments came as he released a report called “Beat China,” which largely focused on strategies for decoupling the U.S. and Chinese economies. 

“Now is the time for action,” Cotton said. “Any serious strategy to beat China must start with a commitment to decouple our countries and key areas in order to exploit the leverage we still have over China, and minimize this leverage over us, as we pull apart.”

The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War
Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 90, February 2021
By Robert D. Blackwill and Philip Zelikow 

In this report, authors Blackwell and Zelikow identify Taiwan as a major source of friction in U.S.-China relations and suggest that the United States has not devised a coherent, effective policy to both ensure Taiwan’s continued autonomy and prevent U.S. involvement in what could be an all-out war with China. They propose greater clarification of U.S. interests in Taiwan and the development of a more robust, credible strategies for deterring a Chinese invasion and, if necessary resisting one. While arguing against any U.S. indication of support for full Taiwanese independence, they advocate support for a quasi-independent state with a distinct political culture of its own. They also advocate efforts to enlist Japan in plans to defend Taiwan, espousing a contemporary variant of the Vietnam era “domino theory.” Here are some excerpts from a press release announcing the report’s publication: 

Proposing “a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years,” the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to 

• affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan’s status;

• work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and

• visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homeland. 

For a PDF of the complete report, click here

Clarity for Beijing and Taipei as Biden team says US will stay with one-China policy
Lawrence Chung, South China Morning Post, Feb. 4, 2021

In this article, the South China Morning Post reports that the Biden administration has reaffirmed the “One China” policy – that is, America’s acknowledgement that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of it. On January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the People’s Republic as China’s legitimate government and terminated official diplomatic ties with the Republic of China (as Taiwan’s government calls itself) but, under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, pledged to provide Taiwan with arms and otherwise support its autonomous status. Key excerpts from the article are provided below. 

State Department spokesman Ned Price said there was no change in the United States’ one-China policy, when asked if the new US administration supported that policy. “Yes … our policy has not changed,” Price said on February 3rd, adding that the Biden administration’s dealings with cross-strait issues were still guided by the one-China policy. 

In a statement on January 23, just days after the inauguration, the administration of US President Joe Biden expressed strong support for the self-ruled island in the face of military pressure from Beijing, but stopped short of mentioning the one-China policy.

China sharpens language, warns Taiwan that independence 'means war'
Tony Munroe & Yew Lun Tian, Reuters, Jan. 28, 2021

Note: This is one of several articles indicating that China is taking a tougher stance toward Taiwan in response to what it perceives as moves by the Taiwanese government, led by President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to move the country closer to a declaration of independence. 

China toughened its language towards Taiwan on January 28, warning after recent stepped-up military activities near the island that “independence means war” and that its armed forces were acting in response to provocation and foreign interference. 

Taiwan, claimed by China as its own territory, reported multiple Chinese fighter jets and bombers entering its southwestern air defence identification zone last weekend, prompting Washington to urge Beijing to stop pressuring Taiwan. 

Asked at a monthly news briefing about the air force’s recent activities, Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Wu Qian said Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. 

“The military activities carried out by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the Taiwan Strait are necessary actions to address the current security situation in the Taiwan Strait and to safeguard national sovereignty and security,” he said. 

“They are a solemn response to external interference and provocations by ‘Taiwan independence’ forces,” he added. 

Wu said a “handful” of people in Taiwan were seeking the island’s independence. “We warn those ‘Taiwan independence’ elements: those who play with fire will burn themselves, and ‘Taiwan independence’ means war,” he added. 

Potential arms sale to Taiwan could put China’s east coast in the crosshairs
Mike Yeo, DefenseNews, Oct. 23, 2020

In this article, Mike Yeo reports that The U.S. State Department’s approval of the potential sales of air- and ground-launched, long-range land-attack missiles to Taiwan is a marked departure from previous American policy of only selling the Taiwanese so-called defensive weapons. The new capabilities, he says, will allow the Taiwanese to mount not only a ground-based counterstrike in the event of Chinese ballistic missile attack on island and to disrupt a potential Chinese invasion by striking ports, air bases, and other military targets across the Taiwan Strait.

The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced Wednesday that the State Department approved three separate arms packages to Taiwan under the Foreign Military Sales program. The potential $1.8 billion deal is for 135 Boeing AGM-84H SLAM-ER missiles; 11 Lockheed Martin M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems [HIMARS]; and six sets of Collins Aerospace’s MS-110 multispectral long-range oblique photography pods. 

The AGM-84H missile will enable Taiwanese F-16s to accurately engage fixed or moving land targets from ranges in excess of 150 miles using a variety of terminal guidance systems, including infrared homing, command guidance and automatic target acquisition. The estimated cost of the missile package, which also includes telemetry and training missiles as well as spares and contractor support, is $1.008 billion. 

Taiwan’s potential acquisition of the truck-mounted HIMARS will also include 64 M57 Army Tactical Missile Systems, which come with missiles, radios, resupply and recovery vehicles, tactical data systems, and practice rockets for an estimated cost of $436.1 million. The M57, which uses inertial and GPS guidance and is used for attacking fix point targets, has a 500-pound unitary warhead and can hit targets up to 190 miles away, putting within range stretches of China’s east coast directly opposite Taiwan.

Time to Rethink Arms Sales to Taiwan 

By A. Trevor Thrall and Jordan Cohen, Defense One, Nov. 2, 2020

Even if Joe Biden wins the election, don’t expect the U.S. to stop selling arms to Taiwan anytime soon. For its part, the Trump administration has gone all in on arming the self-governing island. On Oct. 26, administration officials notified Congress of plans for a $2.37 billion sale of Harpoon missiles to Taiwan, which followed an August sale of 66 F-16 fighter jets and U.S. approval to pursue purchases of missiles, rocket artillery, and aerial reconnaissance sensors worth some $1.8 billion. 

On the surface, selling arms to Taiwan makes sense. Taipei has been an American ally for many decades and the United States has promised to help the island defend itself against China. Advocates of the most recent deal argue that the Harpoon missiles will improve Taiwan’s ability to defend itself from a Chinese attack without direct U.S. involvement. 

The reality, however, is that there is no way for Taiwan to defend itself against a concerted assault by China without American assistance. A few more missiles or fighter jets won’t move the needle much. Given this, arms sales to Taiwan increase tensions with Beijing and generate additional risk without providing any significant benefits to the United States.