Speculation Abounds about Chinese Perceptions of Ukraine War’s Implications for Taiwan – But No Signs of Imminent Plans for an Invasion

Analysis by Michael Klare, May 15, 2022 

Ever since the February 24 Russian invasion of Ukraine, analysts in China, Taiwan, and the U.S. have been pondering the war’s implications for Beijing’s strategic thinking vis-à-vis Taiwan.  

This speculation is understandable, as many observers see a linkage of sorts between Ukraine and Taiwan: both are youthful democracies deemed at risk of being subjugated by more powerful, authoritarian neighbors. And just as Ukraine has received strong support from NATO even though it is not a member of the Alliance, Taiwan would undoubtedly receive strong support from the U.S. and Japan if attacked, even though it has no treaty relations with those countries. It is not surprising, then, that military officials on both sides of the Pacific are watching developments in Ukraine to determine how they might affect Chinese policymaking regarding Taiwan’s future status. 

Among the questions that have been raised in these conversations: Does the Ukraine war make it more or less likely that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will employ force to establish control over Taiwan? If the answer to that question is more likely, does the Ukraine war alter Chinese perceptions about the possible timeline for an invasion? And whatever the timetable, how does the fighting in Ukraine alter Chinese thinking on the conduct of a possible invasion? 

These questions, and the conversations they are stirring up, will no doubt linger for some time to come. But here are some revealing samples of the discussions to date. 

On the first question, regarding the war’s impact on Beijing’s calculus regarding the use of force to seize Taiwan, top U.S. intelligence analysts gave an unequivocal “no” when asked if China was now more likely to invade by members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 10. Similarly, with respect to question two, they said there was no evidence of a speedup of China’s plans to use force.  

“Thus far,” said Avril Haines, the Director of National Intelligence, the intelligence community “does not assess that the Russia-Ukraine crisis is likely to accelerate [China’s] plan vis-à-vis Taiwan.”  

China, Haines indicated, was “surprised by the degree to which the United States and Europe came together to enact sanctions, and that is something they obviously will be looking at in the context of Taiwan.” Also, “one of the issues for them is the confidence they have that they are able to take action in Taiwan over our intervention.” Seeing events unfold in Ukraine “may give them less confidence, in some respects, over what is likely to happen” in a Taiwan invasion, she added. 

A similar assessment was provided by Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. When asked if he thought China would use force to secure Taiwan’s unification with the mainland, he responded, “I believe the PRC would rather not do it by force. I think they would rather do this peacefully over time.”  

And when asked to comment about speculation that China might exploit Washington’s current focus on Ukraine to invade Taiwan soon, Berrier again responded negatively. “On a day-to-day basis, I don’t see anything that would indicate [China] is trying to take advantage” of the West’s attention to Ukraine in the short term,” Berrier said. 

In fact, said Director of Central Intelligence William Burns, the Ukraine war might even discourage China from using force. “I think the Chinese leadership is looking very carefully at all this – at the costs and consequences of any effort to use force to gain control over Taiwan,” he said at a Financial Times even in Washington of May 7. The Chinese government, he indicated, has been struck by Ukraine’s fierce resistance to Russia’s invasion and by the economic costs Russia is bearing as a consequence. “I don’t for a minute think that this has eroded Xi's determination over time to gain control over Taiwan,” he added, “but I think it’s something that’s affecting their calculation about how and when they go about doing that.” 

The third question, on how the Ukraine war might affect thinking in Beijing on how China might conduct an invasion of Taiwan, has aroused the most discussion. 

General Berrier, testifying at that Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on May 10, noted that China was learning “some very interesting lessons” from the Ukraine conflict, including the importance of leadership and small unit tactics, as well as effective training with the right weapons systems and a strong non-commissioned officer force.  

Another set of likely lessons from Ukraine was sketched out by Army General Richard Clarke, head of the U.S. Special Operations Command, at the McCain Institute Sedona Forum on April 30. Given that Putin failed to achieve his goal of conquering Ukraine in a matter of days, he noted, the Chinese are probably altering their plans to ensure that any invasion would begin by bringing overwhelming force to bear on Taipei and other key Taiwanese cities. If I were President Xi, he indicated, I’d probably be thinking, “I’ve gotta do this fast. I have to accomplish this quickly, because the Russians did not.” 

Without doubt, Chinese analysts and officials are pondering many of the same issues. “Many Chinese experts are monitoring this war as if they are imagining how this would unfold if it happened between China and the West,” said Beijing-based security scholar Zhao Tong of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  

“China probably should think about conducting a much stronger and much more comprehensive operation at the very beginning to shock and awe the Taiwanese forces to secure a major advantage,” Zhao said, referring to observations from Chinese strategists. They believe securing that advantage would “deter enemy forces from being willing to intervene,” he said. 

Zhao also indicated that Chinese experts are privately arguing about the need for Beijing to better compete in the so-called information war, which has complicated Russia's position on the battlefield. Western diplomatic efforts – and reporting on atrocities in the war zone – have made it easier to provide aid for Ukraine and harder for Russia to find outside support. To Chinese strategists, Zhao noted, one of the most important lessons of the current conflict was how Western nations “are able to manipulate, from their perspective, international opinion and decisively change the international response to the war.” 

Speculation of this sort can be found at many news sites and no doubt is being voiced at many military gatherings. At this point, it is impossible to determine which, if any of these “lessons” of Ukraine will have a permanent influence on Chinese strategic planning. It should also be noted that the fighting in Ukraine is far from over, so new “lessons” may arise from future battles. But there can be no doubt that the war in Ukraine will be studied closely by Chinese strategists – just as it will by those of other countries.